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ABSTRACT
Essays on Financial Crisis
by
Seungjoon Oh
Chair: Amy Dittmar
My dissertation examines the eects of economic shocks on acquisition outcomes and
the sources of housing market bubble. The rst essay investigates how the combined
eects of target rm- and industry-level distress aect acquisition outcomes through
the re-sale channel. I show that distressed targets are sold at discounts when the
target industry is in distress. Consistent with the Shleifer and Vishny model, the
re-sale eects cause distressed targets to be sold to industry outsiders and acquirers
to gain higher return by exploiting target's weakened bargaining power. I further
demonstrate the re-sale eects in acquisitions by showing that these ndings are
stronger for targets with acquirers that are in dierent industries or where targets
have high industry asset-specicity. I then examine the contagion eects of re-sale
acquisitions on target rivals in the same industry. I nd that rivals earn negative
abnormal returns at the announcement due to negative information from re-sale
acquisitions. Overall, the results show that the re-sale discount in distressed target
acquisitions is an important determinant of nancial distress costs of a rm and
contributes to industry-specic contagion of economic shocks. In the second essay,
I explore (with a coauthor) whether state-level variation in recourse mortgage laws
aects housing prices and mortgage lending. In a state with non-recourse mortgage
law, borrowers have limited liability on their mortgage loan. We nd that non-
recourse law results in larger bubbles in housing prices, and identify the causal eects
by comparing housing prices in contiguous border county-pairs in the United States
and examine discontinuities at state borders. We also explore whether mortgage
lending behavior in non-recourse states reects anticipation of additional risk. We nd
that loan-to-value ratio is lower and mortgage interest rate and loan denial rate are
x
higher in non-recourse states, which suggest that lenders are aware of additional risk
in non-recourse loans. However, we nd that because the emergence of the originate-
to-distribute (OTD) model in the housing markets enables lenders to eectively shift
the risks to other investors, mortgage lending behavior does not fully reect the higher
risk.
xi
CHAPTER I
Fire-Sale Acquisitions and Intra-Industry
Contagion
1.1 Introduction
Ecient reallocation of production inputs enables the economy to increase aggre-
gate productivity and facilitates recovery from industry- and economy-wide recession.
However, existing research on the cyclical properties of asset reallocation nds that
transactions are procyclical, despite dispersion of capital productivity and potential
benets to reallocate being higher during downturns (Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006)).
Frictions due to information asymmetry reduce asset liquidity, thereby distorting re-
allocation. The re-sale is a central mechanism through which asset redeployment
becomes more costly in response to negative economic shocks, and thus those shocks
are amplied (Shleifer and Vishny (2011)).
Fire-sale acquisitions, although they account for two-thirds of asset reallocation1,
have received little academic attention relative to the widely documented existence of
re-sale discounts in real asset transactions. Acquisitions dier from asset markets in
a number of important ways. For example, labor and patented R&D are considered to
be transferred with the change in ownership in acquisitions. Acquisitions also have a
unique advantage with respect to identifying the channel of a re sale, buyer identity
and return being readily observable in contrast to the limited availability of data in
real asset transactions. The goal of this paper is therefore to examine re-sale eects
in distressed target acquisitions by identifying the detailed channel of the discount
and the intra-industry contagion eects to which it gives rise.
A re-sale is an urgent sale of assets in an illiquid market. The essential condition
for a forced sale is a seller's nancial constraint. Firms that face a severe liquidity
1See Figure 1.1.
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constraint may be forced to sell some or all of their assets to avoid bankruptcy. Thus,
distressed acquisitions play an important role as a restructuring mechanism. In an
imperfect world, however, negative economic shocks can cause asset prices to fall
below their fair market values. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) propose a theory in which
industry insiders with higher valuation on a distressed rm's assets are nancially
constrained and sidelined due to nancial frictions, while an industry outsider with
high liquidity and a lower valuation can acquire assets at a lower bid. This model
implies that demand-side frictions in an illiquid market create additional costs in
urgent asset sales.
Empirically, calculating the fair market value of distressed targets in an illiquid
market and examining re-sale discounts in acquisitions are challenging for two rea-
sons. First, a target's oer price reects both re-sale eects and the decline of the
economic worth of its assets. Second, it is important to consider the creation and
division of synergies. To circumvent the rst identication problem, I estimate the
combined eects of target rm- and industry-level distress on acquirer abnormal re-
turns and oer price after controlling for the determinants of the economic worth of
assets. More importantly, I examine the interaction eects of re-sale and industry-
level asset-specicity with which re-sale eects are expected to be stronger, while a
pure decline in economic worth of assets is less associated. Then, I address the sec-
ond problem by decomposing the oer price into synergy and the target's bargaining
power and analyzing these elements separately to identify the source of the discount.
Focusing on acquisitions between public rms that occurred between 1980 and
2010, I identify re-sale acquisitions where both target industries and the targets
themselves were distressed at the announcement. I nd that acquirers in re-sale
acquisitions earn higher cumulative announcement returns relative to other acquirers
over the -1 to +1 day window after controlling for other factors. I further conrm this
result using buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) during the two years following
the acquisitions. This directly supports re-sale discounts in acquisitions because
acquirers' return should be unaected by target rm- and industry-level distress if
acquirers pay the fair market value of a target.
I then analyze the source of this discount by examining the interaction eect
of a target rm- and industry-level distress, separately, on oer price, synergy, and
target's bargaining power. I nd that a distressed target in a distressed industry, or
re-sale target, is acquired at a 14% discount compared to distressed targets in non-
distressed industries. More specically, the channel of re-sale proposed by Shleifer
and Vishny's model implies that re-sales are inecient and exhibit lower synergy. In
2
testing this, I also consider whether target rm- and industry-level distress negatively
aects a target's bargaining power, thereby inducing a re-sale discount that results in
greater gains to buyers. I nd that while the target's bargaining power, measured as
the dierence in announcement returns between target and acquirer, is substantially
weakened, synergy is insignicantly aected, by the interaction eect of rm- and
industry-level distress. These results suggest that observable re-sale discounts are
caused largely by wealth transfer to acquirers.
Next, I investigate whether target rm- and industry-level distress aect a buyer's
identity and whether they drive stronger re-sale eects if acquirers are outside the
industry. Consistent with the model predictions, the results show that industry-wide
distress increases the likelihood of targets being sold to industry outsiders by 20
percentage points and the re-sale eects on acquirer abnormal returns, oer price,
and target's bargaining power are even stronger if targets are sold to acquirers outside
an industry. Particularly, I also nd a both economically and statistically signicant
decrease in total synergy gain conditional on industry outside acquirers, which implies
a deadweight loss from inecient re-sales.
To further demonstrate that the ndings are driven by the re-sale channel, I
examine the interaction eects of combined distress of target rm and industry and
high asset-specicity in three dimensions |capital-specicity, labor union, and R&D
intensity| in which the re-sale eects are expected to be stronger. The Shleifer
and Vishny model suggests that re-sale eects are stronger if targets' assets are
specialized to their industry and, thus, not easily redeployable to industry outsiders.
I show that the re-sale eects are particularly strong for targets with high industry-
specic assets. Specic capital, strong labor unions, and high R&D intensity in target
industries strengthen the re-sale eects by driving up frictions in asset allocation
across industries. These ndings provide evidence that a signicant re-sale discount
exists, in a manner that is consistent with the industry-equilibrium theory of Shleifer
and Vishny. Multiple robustness checks also show that the results are not driven by
stock market undervaluation or macroeconomic recession eects. Overall, using these
multiple complementary approaches, this paper disentangles the re-sale eects from
declines in fundamental value and demonstrates the channel of the re-sale eects in
acquisitions.
Finally, I relate re-sale acquisitions to target industry rivals' stock returns. The
relevant literature highlights contagious eects that economic shocks can transmit
through the re-sale. Fire-sale acquisitions could have a negative information ex-
ternality by providing lower reference prices to subsequent acquisitions coming to
3
market, or have a negative \out-of-play eect2" by reducing potential for an acquisi-
tion partner among industry. I nd that industry rivals of re-sale targets experience
economically and statistically signicant negative abnormal stock returns. The stock
price of industry rivals drops upon announcement of re-sale acquisitions, on average,
by 0.9% over the -1 to +1 day window. The eect of re-sale acquisitions on rivals'
returns is stronger in high R&D industries where are likely to have high information
asymmetry. This evidence supports the view that re-sale acquisitions contribute to
an intra-industry contagion of economic shocks by conveying negative information.
This paper contributes to the literature in several important ways. By providing
new evidence on re-sales in the corporate control market, this paper expands on
previous research on re-sales.3 Pulvino (1998) provides the rst empirical evidence of
re-sale eects on real assets by studying prices of used airplanes, and Campbell et al.
(2011) examine foreclosure discounts from forced home sales. Considerable research
also documents the re-sale of nancial assets (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Coval
and Staord (2007), and Rajan and Ramcharan (2013)). In contrast to asset sales in
real asset or nancial markets, buyers in acquisitions should consider such factors as
labor continuation, technology transfer, successor liabilities, and control premium. I
add to this literature by expanding the notion of resource reallocation beyond physical
capital to general assets including labor and technology. These ndings provide a
better understanding of how frictions negatively inuence ecient resource allocation
during industry- and economy-wide distress.
This paper is closely related to previous studies that analyze how targets' nancial
constraints aect acquisition outcomes.4 Evidence on re-sale acquisitions is mixed,
however, and confounded in the literature by the empirical challenge of calculating
the fundamental value of a target. My examination of re sales in acquisitions takes
account of the combined eects of target and target industry-wide distress as well as
cross-sectional dierences in asset-specicity. Furthermore, my comprehensive anal-
2Banerjee and Eckard (1998), Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005), and Campbell et al. (2011)
3Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Pulvino (1998), Aguiar and Gopinath (2005), Coval and Staord
(2007), Ocer (2007), Bharath and Shumway (2008), Eckbo and Thorburn (2008), Campbell et al.
(2011), Ang and Mauck (2011), Kim (2012), and Shleifer and Vishny (2011). See Shleifer and
Vishny (2011) for a survey of the research on re-sale.
4Ocer (2007) shows that nancially constrained unlisted private targets are acquired at lower
multiples than public targets are. Eckbo and Thorburn (2008), on the other hand, examining the
acquisition outcomes of automatic bankruptcy auctions in Sweden, nd insignicant discounts for
going-concern sales. Ang and Mauck (2011) investigate the acquisition outcomes of distressed rms in
crises and suggest the weak evidence of re-sale discounts in acquisitions. A concurrently developed
working paper by Kim (2012) highlights the negative eects of physical capital specicity on target
premium and returns in acquisitions.
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ysis of buyer identity, return, synergy, and bargaining power provides clear evidence
of re-sale eects in acquisition markets, and identies the channel of inecient asset
reallocation during downturns.
This paper also suggests implications of widespread concerns about industry con-
tagion eects resulting from re-sales. The existence of negative spillover eects in
asset re-sales has been acknowledged in many papers.5 Although re sales have
been shown to be a central channel that amplies economic shocks, little empirical
evidence exists on the relation between re-sale acquisitions and industry rivals' re-
turns. If such a relation exists, it could be argued that re-sale acquisition contributes
to the contagion of economic shocks. This paper shows that re-sale acquisition has
a negative contagious eect within an industry, even in corporate-level transactions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I develop
hypotheses and discuss the related literature. In Section 3, I describe sample selection
and variable construction, and present summary statistics. Eects of re-sale on
acquisition outcomes are examined in Section 4, which also reports the results of
robustness checks. In Section 5, I investigate the impact of re-sale acquisition on
industry rivals. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Hypothesis Development
The primary goal of this study is to address two questions: (1) whether rm- and
industry-level distress cause rms to be sold at discounts due to a re-sale eect, and
(2) how re-sale acquisitions aect a target's industry rivals. In this section, I discuss
the prior literature related to these questions, and develop hypotheses that guide the
empirical analysis.
1.2.1 Fire-Sale in Acquisitions
Distressed rms may face a severe liquidity constraint because they hold insu-
cient cash to meet debt obligations and have diculties in raising capital. They can
sell either some or all of their assets to generate cash needed to make debt payments,
or attempt to renegotiate with creditors in order to restructure debt contracts. In
a perfect world, the resolution of rm distress is costless. An absence of friction in
5Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) propose a macroeconomic model in which shocks can turn into
systemic risk through the lowering of collateral value. Campbell et al. (2011) show that foreclosures
due to default or death result in the lowering of other local house prices. Benmelech and Bergman
(2011) also examine the spillover eects of the sale of a bankrupt aircraft company on its rivals'
collateral value and increased external nancing cost. See also Allen and Gale (2000b), Oh (2012),
and Hertzel and Ocer (2012).
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renegotiating debt contracts would prevent the premature liquidation of assets. Even
in times of industry distress, targets can sell assets at fair market value, which is
based on their updated economic worth (P1), as shown in Figure 1.2(a).
In the real world, however, high nancial distress costs may be incurred. Debt
renegotiation often fails due to such frictions as information asymmetry between a
debtor and its creditors, or holdout problems among creditors (Brown (1989), Gertner
and Scharfstein (1991), and Asquith et al. (1994)). Distressed rms may be forced to
sell their assets or control rights, or to go through a formal legal proceeding such as
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. However, asset restructuring involves a liquidation cost that
depends on market liquidity which, in turn, is determined by the credit constraints
of peer rms and asset redeployability. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) propose precise
theoretical implications of how nancial constraints in an industry give rise to a price
that drops below an asset's revised economic value, a condition known as a re-sale.
Because the subjects of asset sales are fairly specialized within industries, the
rst-best buyers are usually industry insiders that have invested in knowledge of,
and managed, similar assets. However, industry insiders are likely to be nancially
constrained at the same time, if a negative shock is industry-wide. Therefore, the
rst-best buyer with the highest valuation of a distressed rm's assets is often side-
lined due to nancial frictions and industry-wide debt overhang (Myers (1977), and
Clayton and Ravid (2002)). As a result, demand in the secondary asset market drops
further, so prices frequently drop from P1 to the re-sale price PFS in Figure 1.2,
which does not reect longer-term asset potential.
Hypothesis 1 (Fire-Sale Discount): Distressed targets in a distressed industry,
or re-sale targets, are likely to be acquired at discounts.
The Shleifer and Vishny model focuses on a demand-side channel that predicts
inecient sales to industry outsiders with high liquidity but lower synergy. I also
consider whether re-sale is attributed to greater distribution of total gains to buy-
ers. Given that intense negotiations are required to set an acquisition's price, target
rm- and industry-level distress may aect the sharing rule. The bargaining theory
literature provides a rationale for this hypothesis (Nash (1950), Rubinstein (1982),
Binmore et al. (1986), and Gul (1989)). A large body of literature suggests that
two sources of impatience determine relative bargaining outcomes. The rst is the
relative cost of delay from discounting the future (Rubinstein (1982)) and the second,
which views acquisition as a multiplayer bargaining game, is the desire to be the
6
rst to realize gains from a transaction (Gul (1989), and Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson
(2008)6). Target rm- and industry-level distress are expected to negatively aect the
rst source of a target's bargaining power by increasing its discount rate or cost of
capital relative to the acquirer's. In addition, the fact that more sellers with similar
assets are competing in the secondary market during an industry downturn increases
a target's impatience at the negotiation table.
Hypothesis 2-1 (Inecient Sale): Distressed targets in a distressed industry are
acquired at discounts because of the lower synergy gain from a re-sale acquisition.
Hypothesis 2-2 (Wealth Transfer): Distressed targets in a distressed industry are
acquired at discounts because of a target's weaker bargaining power.
The inecient sale hypothesis and wealth transfer hypothesis are not mutually
exclusive but distinguishable, that wealth transfer is not necessarily inecient.
Applying the industry-equilibrium theory of Shleifer and Vishny to distressed tar-
get acquisition, I also expect that distressed targets in a distressed industry are more
likely to be sold to industry outsiders relative to comparable distressed targets in a
non-distressed industry, and I expect re-sale targets acquired by industry outsiders
to experience further discount.
Hypothesis 3 (Acquirer's Identity): Distressed targets in a distressed industry
are more likely to be acquired 1) by industry outsiders, and 2) at a further discount
conditional on industry outside acquirers.
The next hypothesis relates the re-sale eect to cross-sectional dierences in
asset-specicity. The key underlying condition of asset illiquidity during an indus-
try downturn is that assets are specialized, and can thus be fully utilized only by
industry insiders with sucient accumulated knowledge and investment to generate
the highest value from them. Therefore, when assets are highly industry specic, the
inecient sale or wealth transfer incurred by demand-side constraints in a re-sale be-
comes more severe because industry outsiders, who are unable to make the best use of
them, have a lower reservation value on the assets. I consider a simple Cobb-Douglas
6They propose a model that relative bargaining power between target and acquirer depends on
the relative scarcity of each rm's assets, the quality of the match, and the costs of nding another
partner. Consistent with their model, when an industry experiences liquidity constraints, liquidity
and nancing ability become scarce assets that may give more bargaining power to an acquirer.
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production function: a rm uses three factors |capital, labor, and technology| to
produce output. The hypotheses that follow are that the re-sale eects in acquisi-
tion should be stronger in industries with high capital-specicity, strong labor unions,
and high R&D intensity. These characteristics increase the friction in asset allocation
across industries, and thus make the distressed targets less redeployable.
Hypothesis 4 (Asset-specicity): If assets are more specialized to industry insid-
ers due to high capital-specicity, strong labor unions, or high R&D intensity, then
the re-sale discounts should be larger.
1.2.2 Intra-Industry Contagion Eect
Having established the existence of re-sale eects in acquisitions, I extend current
research a step further by examining an industry-specic contagion eect from re-
sale acquisitions. The re-sale eects can be contagious to a target's industry rivals.
Prior literature documents that acquisitions can aect a target's industry rivals
by revealing new information about the value of industry assets.7 Fire-sale prices can
pull down the prices of subsequent acquisitions coming to market by providing a lower
reference price, as Campbell et al. (2011) proposed in housing markets. This negative
information externality can be socially inecient because it may cause rms selling
assets in distressed industries to play a non-cooperative game. The possibility that
updated information from other targets might further discount the option value to
waiting may lead them to be ineciently urgent to sell their assets ahead of others.8
The re-sale acquisitions are also likely to have negative \out-of-play eects" for
a target's industry rivals (Banerjee and Eckard (1998), and Fridolfsson and Stennek
(2005)). Given that the number of capable buyers is limited during an industry down-
turn, announcements of acquisitions reduce the potential partners and the market's
expectation that a rival will be acquired (Akdogu (2011), and Molnar (2007)).
Hypothesis 5-1 (Negative Information): Announcements of distressed target ac-
quisitions in a distressed industry at re-sale prices signal low reference prices and
decreased demand that result in negative stock returns for a target's industry rivals.
7Eckbo (1983), Eckbo and Wier (1985), Song and Walkling (2000), Fee and Thomas (2004), and
Shahrur (2005)
8Contestants compete by escaping rst in this game, in contrast to the famous game theory
model, war of attrition, in which contestants compete by persisting with accumulating costs over
time.
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Previous studies suggest that acquisitions, distinct from the negative information
hypothesis, have implications for industry rivals in terms of changing product market
dynamics. Eckbo (1983) proposes that acquirers gain competitive advantage from
productivity improvements in operating, marketing, distribution, or purchasing ac-
tivities, and the resulting intense product market competition harms industry rivals.
Recent studies by Fee and Thomas (2004) and Shahrur (2005) support this hypothesis
based on evidence from horizontal mergers. This hypothesis predicts a negative stock
return for industry rivals from diminished post-acquisition operating performance.9
Hypothesis 5-2 (Intense Competition): Announcements of distressed target ac-
quisitions in a distressed industry intensify industry competition that results in nega-
tive operating performance, and negative stock returns, for a target's industry rivals.
Alternatively, acquisitions can benet industry rivals by increasing the likelihood
of anticompetitive collusion (Stigler (1964), Eckbo (1983), Kim and Singal (1993) and
Fee and Thomas (2004)). Stigler (1964) proposes that acquiring rms can use their
increased market power to collude with rivals in order to reduce output to monopoly
levels and raise prices at the expense of consumers. If anticompetitive acquisition is
loosely governed by antitrust laws during industry downturns, monopolistic collusion
is likely to motivate acquisitions. Under this hypothesis, I expect rival rms to have
positive stock returns at the announcement of a re-sale acquisition, and improved
operating performance to follow.
Hypothesis 5-3 (Market Power): Announcements of distressed target acquisitions
in a distressed industry result in positive stock returns and improved operating per-
formance for industry rivals through anticompetitive collusion.
Other externalities from re-sale acquisitions may exist in the agency and labor
market channels.10 These, however, are beyond the scope of this paper and remain
for future research.
9This hypothesis can be illustrated by a simple theoretical setting within which acquisition causes
Cournot competition to become Stackelberg competition in which a leader, or combined rm, moves
rst and other rivals move later.
10Substantial discounts in re-sale acquisitions perhaps convey a warning to shareholders and
managers of industry rivals that results in intensied monitoring and reduces agency costs in general.
Moreover, distressed acquisitions that entail intense restructuring and worker layos will aect labor-
related decisions of targets' rivals.
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1.3 Data and Methodology
1.3.1 Sample Construction
The sample of mergers is from the Securities Data Company's (SDC) U.S. Mergers
and Acquisitions Database. This paper employs all completed mergers between U.S.
non-bankrupt public targets and U.S. public bidders during the period 1980-2010. I
require acquiring rms to control less than 50% of the shares of target rms before
the announcement, and the transaction value of deals to be greater than one million
dollars. Both acquirers and targets must be public rms listed on the Center for Re-
search in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat databases during the event window.
I further eliminate rms in a nancial industry (SIC: 6000 - 6999) and utilities (SIC:
4900 - 4999), using their primary SIC code.
1.3.2 Identifying Fire-Sale Acquisitions
The Shleifer and Vishny model theoretically identies rm distress combining
with industry-wide distress as a set of necessary conditions for a re-sale to occur.
Following this model, acquisitions are dened as re-sale acquisitions when both
target industries and targets themselves are distressed at the announcement. The
interaction variable of target rm- and industry-level distress is termed Fire-Sale.
The variable constructions for rm- and industry-level distress are as follows.
1.3.2.1 Measures of Target Distress
To identify the distressed target mergers within the sample, I use two measures
of rm distress widely employed in the literature. The rst measure is based on
the KMV-Merton model that provides a distance measure between expected asset
value and the default threshold based on an option-pricing model (Merton (1974)).
This model calculates default risk by considering equity as a call option on rm
value and debt as a strike price. This measure is widely used in the literature (e.g.,
Committee (1999), Vassalou and Xing (2004), and Chava and Purnanandam (2010)),
and its predictive power has been veried by many studies (e.g., Bharath and Shumway
(2008), and Due et al. (2007)). Following Bharath and Shumway (2008), I construct
expected default frequency (EDF) for each target from the distance to default. I call
this continuous variable Distress1T . The estimation process is detailed in Appendix
A.
The second measure Distress2T , following Pulvino (1998), denes a target as
distressed if its leverage ratio is greater, and its current ratio (current assets/current
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liabilities) less, than the industry median. This measure implies that distressed tar-
gets face both short- and long-term nancial constraints. I dene a rm's industry
as the set of rms with the same 3-digit SIC code.
1.3.2.2 Proxy for Industry Distress
The measure used in this paper for target industry distress should capture the
degree of distress of a target's peer rms as a whole. I dene an industry as distressed
if its median rm's sales growth is negative in the year of acquisition. A rm's industry
is dened as the set of rms with the same 3-digit SIC code. The target rms are
excluded from the calculation of industry variables. This dummy variable is termed
Ind:DistressT .
Additionally, I construct, as a robusteness check, alternative measures of industry
distress 1) if median sales growth is lower than -1% (Ind:Distress2T ), 2) if median
sales growth is lower than +1% (Ind:Distress3T ), and 3) if median sales growth is
negative for two consecutive years (Ind:Distress4T ). I report the main results of
this paper based on the primary measure Ind:DistressT . The results with alterna-
tive industry distress measures are reported in Internet Appendix. The results are
qualitatively robust.11
1.3.3 Control Variables
In order to compare acquisition outcomes over dierent degrees of target rm-
and industry-level distress, I control for other characteristics that may potentially
drive the results. Control variables used in this study include target, acquirer, and
deal and industry characteristics as well as year and industry xed-eects. Firm-
and industry-level proxies for future protability and growth options are included
to account for drops in the economic worth of assets. For the industry level, I add
median industry Q, dened as the ratio of market value of asset (estimated as book
value of total asset - book value of equity + market value of equity) to book value
of asset. For the rm level, I include target protability (prot margin: the ratio
of operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) divided by total sales) and target
market-to-book ratio.
11Following previous literature (e.g., Gilson et al. (1990); Opler and Titman (1994); Acharya
et al. (2007); and Ang and Mauck (2011)), I also attempt to use as a measure of industry distress
the negative industry median net income of all rms in an industry. Median net income appears
to be a poor measure of industry distress, however, because of cross-industry variation in average
net income levels. Negative net income for a substantial portion of high-tech industry rms in the
public stock market does not necessarily mean that the high-tech industry is distressed.
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Other rm characteristics considered in the specication include size, dened as
the natural log of market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement, leverage,
dened as the ratio of debt (current debt plus long-term debt) to book value of assets,
and tangibility, dened as the PP&E scaled by total book value of assets. Median
industry leverage is dened as the 3-digit SIC-level median leverage ratio. Major
deal characteristics suggested in the previous literature are also considered. Deal
specic controls include same industry, tender oer, toehold, competing, poison pill,
and termination fee. All variables are dened further in Table 1.1.
1.3.4 Summary Statistics
Table 1.2 presents summary statistics of key variables used in this study. Panel
A of Table 1.2 identies targets' pre-merger characteristics. The mean and median
of Distress1T , rm default risk EDF , is 0.111 and 0.001 with standard deviation of
0.227. This variable shows high positive skewness. Of 1572 acquisitions in the sample,
955 targets have lower than 1% EDF at the announcement of acquisition. Panel B
presents the acquirers' characteristics. It shows that the acquirers, on average, have
lower default risk than targets while having larger size, higher q, and higher prot
margin.
Table 1.3 reports the major deal characteristics of the acquisition sample. The
mean (median) premium based on targets' four weeks before the announcement is
50% (38%). The relative size between target and acquirer is, on average, 0.84. Tender
oers account for 25% of total acquisitions, and acquirers hold, on average, 3% of a
target's shares before acquisition. Acquirers are less likely to use cash for payment,
in the distressed target acquisition sample. Lastly, 54% of acquisitions occur in the
same industry.
1.4 Fire-Sale Eects on Acquisition Outcomes
I employ multiple empirical approaches to examine re-sale eects from a tar-
get's rm- and industry-level distress and identify a channel for the eects. First, I
estimate the combined eect of target rm- and industry-level distress on acquirers'
abnormal returns. Under the null hypothesis, acquirers' return should be unaected
by target rm- and industry-level distress. I assess whether distressed targets in a
distressed industry are sold at discounts by comparing acquirers' abnormal returns
between re-sale acquisitions and other acquisitions. Second, I estimate the re-sale
eects on oer price after controlling for industry-median Q, rm Q and the rm
protability measure. These rm- and industry-level growth option and protability
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measures control for the decline in the economic worth of target assets by capturing
future growth prospects of the assets. Then, I examine whether re-sale aects syn-
ergy or target bargaining power by decomposing the oer price and analyzing each
component separately. Fourth, I test whether target rm- and industry-level distress
aect buyer's identity and whether they drive stronger re-sale eects if acquirers
are outside the industry. Finally, to demonstrate that the ndings are driven by the
re-sale channel, I estimate cross-sectional regressions using industry asset-specicity
in three dimensions: capital-specicity, labor union, and R&D intensity. This empir-
ical design enables me to disentangle the re-sale eects from the decline in economic
worth and identify the channel of the re-sale eects.
1.4.1 Acquirer Return in Fire-Sale Acquisitions
The rst test relates the re-sale eect to acquirers' return. To provide support
for the proposed re-sale channel in which rm- and industry-wide distress combine to
force the sale of a target at a discount, I compare acquirers' abnormal return between
re-sale targets and distressed targets in a non-distressed industry. Following Shleifer
and Vishny (1992), I dene re-sale acquisitions as when both target industry and
target are distressed at the time of the deal announcement. The interaction term of
target distress (DistressT ) and target industry distress (Ind:DistressT ) is termed
Fire-Sale.
As shown in Figure 1.3, I begin by plotting the evolution of the cumulative ab-
normal returns of acquirers from 20 days before to 200 days after announcement of
the acquisition. Abnormal returns are calculated as the acquirer's return minus a
value-weighted market index. The gure shows that cumulative abnormal returns
of acquirers in re-sale acquisitions lie well above other acquisitions throughout the
200 days following the acquisition announcements. The graph implies that acquirers
of distressed targets in distressed industries earn higher abnormal returns compared
to other acquirers, which suggests that targets in distressed industries are sold at a
discount.
I next compare the short-term announcement return of acquirers over the target's
rm- and industry-level distress. The short-term return is estimated as the acquirer's
three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) at announcement of the acquisition,
using the standard method of Bradley et al. (1988).12 Figure 1.4 plots the eect of
industry-wide distress on acquirer's three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
12I use the Fama-French three-factor model with 240 daily returns covering (-300, -60) to estimate
parameters for each acquirer.
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over target rm distress measure, Distress1T (EDF). The dots represent the CARs
for acquirers of targets in distressed industries, and the pluses are for non-distressed
industries. The black solid line and navy dashed line show the tted values of obser-
vations in distressed industries and non-distressed industries, respectively. Figure 1.4
shows that acquirers of targets in distressed industries earn positive CARs and out-
perform acquirers of targets in non-distressed industries as targets experience severe
rm distress.13 Panel A of Table 1.4 compares short-term announcement return of
acquirers over the target's rm- and industry-level distress. It shows that acquirers'
returns are signicantly negative, on average, whereas acquirers in re-sale acquisi-
tions earn insignicant negative returns.
I also estimate acquirers' buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR), which is a
commonly used measure of long-term abnormal performance14, of re-sale acquisi-
tions and those of other acquisitions. I use a two-year window for the long-term
performance analysis to reduce potential noise from overlapping events that can in-
uence performance.15 I dene BHAR as follows.
BHARi;t =
TiY
j=1
(1 + ri;t+j) 
TiY
j=1
(1 + rMatched rmt+j)
where ri;t denotes the return to stock i over month t and Ti is the holding period for
stock i.16
Matched rms are selected based on the following procedures. 1) Select all CRSP-
listed companies at the year of the acquisition. 2) Select the subset of rms with total
book asset values within 30% of the total book asset values of the acquiring rm.
3) Rank the subset based on market-to-book ratio. 4) Choose the rm with the
closest market-to-book ratio. 5) Matched rms are included for the full two-year
holding period. Panel B of Table 1.4 shows that acquirers of distressed targets in a
distressed industry earn positive BHARs. The abnormal returns of acquirers in re-
sale acquisitions are substantially higher than the returns of acquirers of distressed
targets in non-distressed industries in the same two-year window. The dierence
between acquirer returns are statistically signicant at the 5% level.
13It is also important note that the condence interval becomes larger for targets in distressed
industries.
14Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997), and Lyon et al. (1999).
15I estimate these results based on the 3- and 5-year window following the announcement date
and nd robust results.
16The potential bias of the BHAR measure, albeit well recognized, may not qualitatively aect
the results because I concentrate on dierences in performance in re-sale and other acquisitions.
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Because the previous analysis does not control for other variables that might
be driving the dierences in acquirer returns, I also examine the re-sale eects on
acquirers' short-term and long-term returns using a multivariate analysis. Hypothesis
1 predicts a strong positive coecient on the interaction term of target's rm- and
industry-level distress for the following specication:
CARAijdt = 1(Ind.Dit Distressit| {z }
Fire-Sale
) + 2Ind.Dit + 3Distressit + 
0
Xijd + t + i + "ijdt
BHARAijdt = 1(Ind.Dit Distressit| {z }
Fire-Sale
) + 2Ind.Dit + 3Distressit + 
0
Xijd + t + i + "ijdt
where CARAijdt is the acquirer's three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) at
announcement of acquisitions, estimated using a market model. BHARAijdt is an
acquirer buy-and-hold return during two years following acquisition announcement
less a buy-and-hold return of the matched rm, Distressit and Ind:Dit are the target
rm and industry distress measures, respectively, of target i, and Xijd represents
control variables for target i, acquirer j, and deal characteristics d. Year xed eect
(t) and industry xed eect (i) are also included. Control variables are as follows.
Xijd =
8>>><>>>:
Target & Acquirer Char.: Size, M/B, Leverage, Protability, Tangibility
Deal Char.: Same industry, Tender oer, Toehold, Competing, Term. Fee
Industry Char.: Med. industry Q, Med. industry Leverage
The variable of interest is Fire-Sale, the interaction between target rm- and industry-
level distress. Fire-Sale1 is the interaction between the continuous measure of tar-
get distress based on the distance-to-default model, Distress1T and Ind:DistressT .
Fire-Sale2 is the interaction between the dummy measure,Distress2T and Ind:DistressT .
Hypothesis 1 predicts all of these interaction eects to be positive.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 1.5 present the results of examining the re-sale ef-
fects on acquirers' cumulative abnormal returns at announcement (-1, +1). It shows
that acquirers earn economically and statistically higher returns in re-sale acquisi-
tions. The economic magnitude of this eect is 2.5 percentage points based on the
coecient of Fire-Sale1 and a one standard deviation increase in Distress1T
17, and
5 percentage points based on the coecient of Fire-Sale2. The coecients are sta-
tistically signicant at the 1% level. I also nd positive coecients on the re-sale
17The standard deviation of Distress1T is 0.23 in Table 1.2. The economic magnitude can be
calculated by 0.11*0.23 = 2.5%
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eect in Models (3) and (4). In Model (3), the coecient implies that acquirer buy-
and-hold abnormal returns are 23.2 percentage points higher in distressed industries
with a one standard deviation increase in Distress1T . This directly supports re-sale
discount in acquisitions because acquirers' return should be unaected by target rm-
and industry-level distress if they pay the fair market value of a target.18
1.4.2 Inecient Sales or Wealth Transfer?
The previous results show that acquirers earn higher returns from re-sale acqui-
sitions. To provide evidence of a specic source for these higher returns, I estimate
the combined eect of rm- and industry-level distress on oer price after controlling
for rm- and industry-level investment opportunity measures. Then, I decompose of-
fer price into synergy and target's bargaining power, and quantify the re-sale eects
on the components of division of gains separately.
Pi = Vi + Sij  !Ti| {z }
Division of Gains
where
Pi = total proceeds(oer price) for target i
Vi = stand-alone value of target i
Sij = synergy from acquisition between target i by acquirer j
!Ti = target i's bargaining power
1.4.2.1 Fire-Sale Discount on Oer Price
To examine the eect of a re-sale on the oer price a target receives, I employ
three dierent measures of oer price for target shareholders from the SDC database.
The rst measure Ln(Price1) is the log of total equity value (EQVAL). I use the
log transformation for these variables to adjust skewed size distribution. The second
measure Ln(Price2) is the log of total transaction value (TRANSACT ). Transaction
value represents the equity value of the target company (i.e., oer price per share
* shares outstanding plus cost to acquire convertibles) plus any assumed liabilities
that are publicly disclosed.19 The third measure, Premium, is oer price per share
18I report, as a robustness check, coecient estimates from quantile regressions (25th, median,
and 75th) on acquirer abnormal returns in Internet Appendix. While the coecients vary across
quantiles, the results show that the relationship between acquirer returns and re-sale is robust at
dierent points in the conditional distribution of acquirer returns.
19The correlation between Ln(Price1) and Ln(Price2) is 0.98.
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divided by target stock price four weeks prior to announcement.20
Hypothesis 1 predicts a strong negative coecient on the interaction term of
target's rm- and industry-level distress for the following specication:
Priceijdt = 1(Ind.Dit Distressit| {z }
Fire-Sale
) + 2Ind.Dit + 3Distressit + 
0
Xijd + t + i + "ijdt
where Distressi and Ind:Di are the target rm and industry distress measures,
respectively, of target i, and Xijd represents control variables for target i, acquirer
j, and deal characteristics d. Year xed eect(t) and target industry xed eect
(i) are also included. Standard errors are heteroskedasty-consistent and clustered
at year-industry.
In Columns (1), (3) and (5) of Table 1.6, the coecients on Fire-Sale1 are nega-
tive and statistically signicant to all measures of oer price. These results indicate
that distressed targets in a distressed industry are acquired at a discount relative to
distressed targets in a non-distressed industry. The economic magnitude can be inter-
preted as 14 percentage points discount relative to distressed targets in non-distressed
industries for an increase of one standard-deviation of the default risk, Distress1T .
21
As shown in Columns (2), (4), and (6) of Table 1.6, the results are robust to use of
the dummy variable of rm distress, Distress2T and its interaction term Fire-Sale2.
In the presence of rm- and industry-level protability, this signicant interaction
term in Table 1.6 provides support for the re-sale eect in Hypothesis 1.
1.4.2.2 Synergy and Bargaining Power in Fire-Sale Acquisitions
Measuring the division of total gains on the basis of the abnormal stock return at
the announcement date enables me to identify the source of re-sale discount in the
previous results. Synergy is measured in two ways based on Bradley et al. (1988). I
use (1) combined CAR: market equity value weighted average of target's CAR and
acquirer's CAR, and (2) Ln(Synergy): the log of the sum of acquirer's and target's
abnormal dollar return (CAR MarketCap). I employ a bargaining outcome mea-
sure that uses the dierence in abnormal dollar returns between target and acquirer
following Ahern (2011).22 Basically, the bargaining outcome is the percentage of a
20Although Premium is widely used in literature to compare the oer price, this measure is
aected by the reference stock price in the denominator, which is particularly confounded by target
rm- and industry- distress. Therefore, I focus on the equity value in this paper.
21The standard deviation of Distress1T is 0.23 in Table 1.2. The economic signicant can be
calculated by Exp((-0.89+0.23)*0.23)-1 = -14%)
22Oer premium, which is used by most bargaining-related papers (e.g., Ocer (2003), and
Subramanian (2003)) does not necessarily capture a target's relative bargaining outcome because it
does not properly consider the acquirer's share of gains.
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rm's abnormal gain over total abnormal synergistic gain. One problem with using
abnormal return to measure bargaining outcome is that it can be negative for the
acquirer. A player with a negative expected bargaining outcome will not participate
in the game.23 I avoid this problem by using the dierence in dollar gains between
target and acquirer as a proxy for the target's bargaining outcome. Following Ahern
(2011), I normalize this measure by dividing by the sum of the acquirer's and target's
market values four weeks prior to the announcement. The measure of the acquirer's
relative bargaining power is,
NDCART =
DCARTarget  DCARAcq
MVTarget +MVAcq
where DCAR: Dollar Cumulative Abnormal Return at the announcement (-1, +1).
I construct, as a robustness check, an alternative measure that calculates the
ratio of the target's abnormal dollar return to the combined abnormal dollar return
of acquirer and target, and winsorize this ratio by 0 and 1. This measure is more
intuitive, but potentially downward biased if negative abnormal returns are frequent
for acquirers.
BargainT =
8>>>><>>>>:
DCARTarget
DCARTarget +DCARAcq
if DCARTarget > 0; DCARAcq > 0
0 if DCARTarget < 0; DCARAcq > 0
1 if DCARTarget > 0; DCARAcq < 0
where DCAR: Dollar Cumulative Abnormal Return at the announcement (-1, +1).
I then estimate the eect of rm- and industry-level distress on each component
using the following specications.
Sijdt = 1(Ind.Dit Distressit| {z }
Fire-Sale
) + 2Ind.Dit + 3Distressit + 
0
Xijd + t + i + "ijdt
!Tijdt = 1(Ind.Dit Distressit| {z }
Fire-Sale
) + 2Ind.Dit + 3Distressit + 
0
Xijd + t + i + "ijdt
where Sijdt denotes the measure for synergy and !
T
ijdt denotes target's bargaining
power. Distressi and Ind:Di are the target rm and industry distress measures,
respectively, of target i, and Xijd represents control variables for target i, acquirer
23Many studies explain the negative acquirer return based on such drivers of mergers as the
hubris hypothesis, the market-driven misvaluation hypothesis, swarm behavior, and the market
mania hypothesis (Roll (1986), Malmendier and Tate (2005) , Malmendier and Tate (2008), Shleifer
and Vishny (2003)).
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j, and deal characteristics d. Year xed eect(t) and target industry xed eect
(i) are also included. Standard errors are heteroskedasty-consistent and clustered
at year-industry.
Hypothesis 2-1 predicts lower synergy in re-sale acquisitions and lower corre-
sponding gain for targets. Columns (1)-(4) in Table 1.7, however, show that both
measures of synergy have an insignicant relation with the interaction eects of target
rm- and industry-level distress. One interpretation of this result is that re-sale ac-
quisitions with severe ineciency are avoided by a conservative ex-ante debt structure
or by alternative resolution of distress (Morellec (2001), and Campello and Giambona
(2012)). Alternatively, this result is consistent with current research by Almeida et al.
(2011) and Erel et al. (2013), that highlights the importance of nancial synergy.
The results in Models (5)-(8) in Table 1.7, on the other hand, show that target
rm- and industry-level distress has a negative and signicant impact on a target's
bargaining outcome. Models (5) and (6) present coecient estimates onNDCAR(!T ).
The coecient of the interaction eect is economically large and statistically signi-
cant, and the eect is robust to both measures of target distress. This result implies
that distressed targets in a distressed industry receive a substantially lower portion of
total gains relative to other targets in the sample. The economic magnitudes are $40
million further transfer to acquirer for a one standard deviation increase in a target's
default probability in a distressed industry or 5% * $1.8 billion = $90 million further
transfer to acquirer based on Fire-Sale2. Consistent with this result, the regression
estimates in Models (7) and (8) indicate that targets have 10-20 percentage points
lower bargaining share of total synergy gain in re-sale acquisitions.
In sum, these results provide support for the bargaining channel of the re-sale
eects proposed in Hypothesis 2-2, which states that distressed targets in a distressed
industry are acquired at discounts due to targets' weakened bargaining power.
1.4.3 Acquirer Identity in Fire-Sale Acquisitions
1.4.3.1 Eect of Industry-wide Distress on Acquirer Identity
Thus far, the results suggest that nancial constraints of targets and their peer
rms drives a price discount. To provide further evidence of re-sale eects, I explore
the eects of target rm- and industry-level distress on acquirers' identity, whether
they are inside or outside the target's industry. The null hypothesis is that acquirer
identity is unaected by target rm- and industry-level distress. Alternatively, the
main hypothesis of this paper is that targets are likely to sell to industry outsiders
when their peer rms are nancially constrained, as in Hypothesis 3. To test this
hypothesis, I compare the probability of being acquired by industry outsiders over
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target rm- and industry-level distress using the following probit model to estimate
probability.
Prob:(Outsiderijdt) = 1(Ind.Dit Distressit| {z }
Fire-Sale
) + 2Ind.Dit + 3Distressit + 
0
Xijd + t + i + "ijdt
where Outsiderijdt is the dummy equals 1 if acquirer j, has a dierent 3-digit SIC
code from target i., Distressi and Ind:Di are the rm and industry distress measures,
respectively, of target i, and Xijd represents control variables for target i, acquirer j,
and deal characteristics d. Year xed eect and industry xed eect are also included.
Table 1.8 presents estimates of the probability that targets are sold to industry
outsiders. Acquirer and deal characteristics are excluded in Models (1) and (3) to
control for potential endogeneity.24 I nd large and signicant coecients for the
industry distress measure in all Models (1)-(4). The coecient on industry distress
captures the dierence in probability of being acquired by industry outsiders. The
result, evaluated at the means of independent variables, indicates that targets in a
distressed industry are more likely to sell to outside buyers by 20 percentage points
compared with targets in a non-distressed industry. The stand-alone variable of
target distress and the interaction term of target rm- and industry-level distress
have insignicant coecients. The results imply that when the target industry is
distressed, peer rms in the same industry are not capable of buying the target.
1.4.3.2 Fire-Sale Acquisitions with Outsider
I next examine the triple-interaction eect of target rm distress, industry dis-
tress, and outside acquirer dummy. Hypothesis 3 suggests that the eects on re-sale
targets should be stronger if the targets are sold to acquirers outside a target's in-
dustry.
Table 1.9 presents the estimates from regressions that explain the main acquisition
outcomes using the interaction variable of re-sale and acquirer's industry identity.25
I nd that the interaction eects of target rm- and industry-level distress on ac-
quirer returns, oer price, and target's bargaining power are stronger when acquirers
are from dierent industries. The triple-interaction eects are economically large and
statistically signicant. The results in Table 1.9 indicate that, if the acquirer is an
industry outsider, a one standard deviation increase in the target's default probabil-
ity during industry distress increases the acquirers' return by 4.6 percentage points,
and decreases the oer price by 47.5% and the target's bargaining power by 5.8%.
24Acquirer and deal characteristics are determined simultaneously with acquirer identity.
25In this analysis, I report the results with Fire-Sale1 due to the small sample size with Fire-Sale2.
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Crucially, I also nd that the coecient of triple interaction term on synergy becomes
negative and statistically signicant, which indicates that a deadweight cost incurred
from inecient re-sales conditional on industry outside acquirers.
It is also important to note that the interaction term of target rm- and industry-
level distress, Fire Sale1 becomes insignicant in Models (1)-(3) when the triple in-
teraction eect with industry outsider is included. This suggests that the results in
the previous section is largely driven by re-sale acquisitions with industry outsiders.
This result supports Hypothesis 3, or the re-sale channel suggested by the Shleifer
and Vishny model.
1.4.4 Fire-Sale Eects with Specialized Assets
When assets are highly industry specic, ineciency from demand-side con-
straints becomes more severe as industry outsiders are not able to utilize the assets
to their best-use. The resulting prediction is that distressed targets in an industry
with high asset specicity may be sold at a deeper discount in an illiquid market. I
test this prediction with three main input factors |capital, labor, and technology|
of production function.
1.4.4.1 Fire-Sale Eects and Capital-Specicity
I construct the proxy for industry (physical) capital-specicity using the Census-
based industry-level measure provided by Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2009).
They calculate the ratio of rms' used capital expenditures to the aggregate industry
capital expenditure, which captures capital re-salability or capital liquidity within an
industry.26 Their index is based on the U.S. Census Bureau dataset for manufacturing
sectors for the years 1987 and 1992. Following the approach of Almeida et al. (2011),
I create a time-invariant measure of industry-level capital-specicity by one minus
the median value of this index for an industry within the 3-digit SIC code over the
Census survey of 1987 and 1992.
Alternatively, I measure industry capital-specicity based on industry's property,
plant, and equipment (PP&E) scaled by the book value of total assets. This measure,
however, proxies for overall tangibility of the industry instead of industry capital-
specicity because property, including real estate, is highly redeployable. I also at-
tempt to use a further alternative measure that uses an industry's machinery and
equipment (PPENME) scaled by the book value of total assets obtained from COM-
26This proxy is also used as a measure of capital salability within an industry by Almeida and
Campello (2007) and Almeida et al. (2011).
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PUSTAT. However, this analysis lacks statistical power because this value has been
absent from COMPUSTAT since 1997. In untabulated results, I nd statistically
insignicant coecients in related regression tests using these capital-specicity mea-
sures.
Table 1.10 presents estimates of target rm- and industry-level distress on the main
dependent variables over industry capital-specicity. I examine the triple-interaction
eect of target rm distress, industry distress, and industry capital-specicity measure
on acquisition outcomes.27 The dependent variables are acquirer's abnormal return
(CARA), oer price (Ln(Price1)), target's bargaining power (NDCAR(!
T )) and
synergy (CARcombined).
I nd that the re-sale eects on acquirer's abnormal return, oer price, target's
bargaining power, and synergy are economically large and statistically signicant
when industry-level capital-specicity is high. The magnitude of re-sale eects,
moreover, becomes greater than the regression results in the previous results.
With a one standard deviation increase in target industry-level capital speci-
city(0.03), the acquirer abnormal returns further increase by 1.3 percentage point,
oer price decreases by 23.6%, and NDCART decreases by 1.9%. Particularly, in
Model (4), the synergy, measured by combined abnormal returns at the announce-
ment, decreases by around 2.0 percentage point.
These results indicate that the main results in the previous section are driven by
asset illiquidity consistent with the proposed Hypothesis 4 and thus provide strong
evidence for the re-sale channel.
1.4.4.2 Fire-Sale Eects and Target Labor Union
I further investigate the impact of target labor unions on the re-sale eects.
Labor unions play a signicant role in protecting workers' rights through collective
bargaining. Strong labor unions could increase restructuring costs by inuencing
layo costs or severance payments and blocking restructurings and plant closings
(McLaughlin and Fraser (1984)). Especially high costs may be incurred during indus-
try downturns, when acquirers may need to restructure rms intensively. Therefore,
industries with strong labor unions may thus experience less demand in acquisition
markets during industry downturns. A strong labor union could also inuence a dis-
tressed rm to sell all of its assets with a guarantee of labor continuation, thereby
reducing the acquisition price and transferring wealth from the distressed target's
27The stand-alone variable for Capital-Specicity is omitted in the regression specication because
Capital-Specicity is a time-invariant industry-level measure which is captured by the industry xed
eect.
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shareholders to its workers. This hypothesis predicts that if a target industry has
a strong labor union, then the re-sale eects should be stronger because strong
labor union increases restructuring costs and thus makes the distressed target less
redeloyable.
Alternatively, a strong labor union can resist acquisitions, in particular, hostile
takeovers, by refusing to tender workers' shares or voting against acquisitions (Pagano
and Volpin (2005), and Kim and Ouimet (2013)). This will lower the probability of
receiving a takeover bid, but increase the oer price. It is also possible for strong
labor unions to make concessions to and create more synergy gain for acquirers by
giving up their rents. This competing hypothesis predicts that the re-sale eects are
likely to be mitigated in industries with strong labor unions.
Therefore, it is empirical question to examine whether strong labor unions in
target industries promote the re-sale eects or not. I perform a subsample analysis
using regressions with the same specications as in main regressions, but dividing the
total sample into strong labor union industries and weak labor union industries.
I employ a labor unionization measure that records the percentage of unionized
workers in each 3-digit SIC industry from 1980-2010. The Union Membership and
Coverage Database constructed by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson compiles
industry-level unionization data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) of the
Bureau of Labor Statistics.28 The database provides two unionization measures, (1)
the percentage of labor union membership, and (2) the percentage of workers covered
by a collective bargaining agreement.29 CPS classies industries based on rms'
primary Census Industry Classication (CIC) codes. In the present study, I match
each CIC industry to a 3-digit SIC industry by comparing the industry specication.
Table 1.2 reports the descriptive statistics for the rst labor union variable. I create
a dummy variable for strong labor union industry that equals one if the labor union
measure is above the median value of total sample.
The results in Table 1.11 show that the re-sale eects combined with strong labor
unions result in further increases in returns for acquirers, a deeper discount in oer
prices, and weaker bargaining outcomes for targets. Comparing each column between
Panels A and B, I nd that the coecients on re-sale variable are economically
larger and statistically more signicant when the target industry has a strong labor
union. These results suggest that strong labor unions promote the re-sale eects by
28At www.unionstat.com, Hirsch and Macpherson (2002)
29I mainly employ the rst measure. The correlation between two unionization measures is 0.99.
The results are robust with the second measure.
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generating further demand-side frictions.
1.4.4.3 Fire-Sale Eects and R&D Intensity
I next explore how asset-specicity in technology (intangible assets) aects re-
sale eects in distressed target acquisitions in a distressed industry. Technology-
intensive industries play particularly important roles in acquisition markets. Previous
literature documents that productive opportunity is a main motivation of acquisitions
(e.g., Higgins and Rodriguez (2006), and Levine (2011)). However, there is little
evidence on how variation in an industry's technology intensity aects acquisition
outcomes across dierent industry-specic nancial conditions.
Aboody and Lev (2000) suggests that R&D may increase rm- and industry-level
information asymmetry for the following three reasons. First, contrary to capital or
labor, R&D is more likely to be specic to a rm and its industry, so, across indus-
tries, rms have diculty in sharing knowledge on their technologies and undergoing
R&Ds. Second, relatively less organized markets for technology assets lead outsiders
not to infer the precise value of the assets from market prices. Third, the current ac-
counting rule does not require to report value and productivity changes of R&D after
being expensed. Building on this argument, I develop a hypothesis that technology-
or knowledge-based assets are likely to be less redeployable to industry outsiders,
particularly during an illiquid market, therefore, strengthening re-sale eects in ac-
quisitions. Higher information asymmetry embedded in technology-intensive industry
drives more frictions in asset allocation across industries because industry outsiders
have more diculty in valuing and operating the assets.
I examine this hypothesis by estimating the combined eect of target rm- and
industry-level distress on acquisition outcomes with dierent R&D intensities. I mea-
sure R&D intensity based on research and development expenses divided by total
sales. This variable is set to zero if total assets are reported for a rm in the same
year but no record is reported for R&D expenses. I separate the total sample into high
and low R&D industry subsamples. An observation is considered to be high (low)
R&D industry if its industry-level R&D intensity is below (above) the median value
of total sample. Subsample analysis with separate estimation enables coecients of
the control variables and xed eects to vary across high and low R&D regimes.
In Table 1.12, results for the subsamples are reported in Panels A and B. Each
panel presents the re-sale eects on acquirer's abnormal returns (CARA), oer price
(Ln(Price1)), target's bargaining power (NDCAR(!T )) and synergy (CARcombined).
Comparing each column between the two Panels A and B of Table 1.12, I nd that
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the re-sale eects on acquirer's abnormal return, oer price, and target's bargaining
power are economically large and statistically signicant only in high R&D industries.
In Panel A, these coecients are sharper than those for the full sample. In contrast,
in Panel B, they reveal no relation when R&D intensity is low. This is robust in both
target rm distress measures. These results further support Hypothesis 4 that price
discounts in distressed target acquisitions in a distressed industry are driven by the
re-sale channel rather than the decline in economic worth of target assets.
1.4.5 Alternative Explanations
1.4.5.1 Stock Market Undervaluation in Fire-Sale Acquisitions
A potential concern with the previous results is that the re-sale discount and
related acquisition outcomes could be driven by stock market undervaluation. Many
studies in the M&A literature show that stock market misvaluation drives acquisition
activity and outcomes (Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan
(2004), and Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005)). If either rm- or industry-level distress causes
systematic undervaluation of targets, it would be possible for informed acquirers to
purchase undervalued targets at prices below their fundamental values.
As a robustness check, I re-estimate the re-sale eects in the main regressions
using the same explanatory variables and including measures for target rm- and
industry-level undervaluation. Following Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), I measure target
undervaluation by decomposing the market-to-book ratio of rms with the same 3-
digit SIC code into three components: rm-specic error; industry-wide, short-run
error; and long-run growth option. Details of this estimation are provided in Appendix
A. Table 1.13 presents the descriptive statistics for the robustness checks. Panel A
shows that the book-to-value ratio is lower for distressed than for non-distressed
targets. Moreover, distressed targets are undervalued, on average, by 2% at the rm
level.30 Sector errors are -6% in all samples.
The regression results in Table 1.14 show that target misvaluation has signicant
eects on all dependent variables except target's bargaining power. Model (1) indi-
cate that a negatively misvalued target receives a signicantly lower oer price, and
Model (2) show that the target undervaluation results in higher returns for acquirers.
In Model (4), I also nd that the negative misvaluation of a target can increase com-
bined abnormal returns in acquisitions, which implies that target undervaluation is
a source of additional synergy gain. The target industry misvaluation measures are
insignicant in all specications. The results support that re-sale targets are priced
30A negative number of misvaluation implies that targets are undervalued.
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below their fundamental values and it inuences acquisition outcomes signicantly.
However, the re-sale variable, the interaction of target rm- and industry-level dis-
tress, remains signicant and consistent with the main results, even in the presence
of the target misvaluation measure. The results thus show that the re-sale channel
is essential to explaining the outcomes of distressed target acquisition.
1.4.5.2 Fire-Sale Acquisitions in Recession
While the present study measures industry-specic distress and estimates the re-
sale eects on acquisition outcomes, Ang and Mauck (2011) investigated the eect
of economy-wide recession on acquisitions and argued that recession drives a higher
oer premium for distressed targets because acquirers assume the targets to be largely
depressed during recession. In this section, I control for the recession dummy variable
and examine the eect of target rm- and industry-level distress on key variables.
Recessions are dened in terms of recessionary months identied by NBER, as in Ang
and Mauck (2011).
Table 1.15 presents coecient estimates from an OLS regression that uses the same
explanatory variables as in the paper's main regressions, but includes the recession
dummy variable. The results in Table 1.15 show that the recession dummy has
a negative eect on acquirer's return. Target bargaining power is also positively
related with the recession dummy. In all specications, however, coecients on the
main explanatory variable, the interaction eect of target distress and target industry
distress, are robust and consistent with the main regressions in the previous sections.
This result provides evidence that industry-specic rather than economy-wide distress
accounts for the re-sale eects in distressed target acquisitions.
1.5 Intra-Industry Contagion of Fire-Sales
In this section, I examine the contagion eects of re-sale acquisitions on target
rivals in the same industry by exploring rivals' operating performance and abnor-
mal stock returns following the announcement of a target's re-sale acquisition. The
negative information hypothesis predicts negative stock returns, but makes no partic-
ular prediction with respect to post-acquisition operating performance. However, the
intense competition hypothesis predicts negative stock returns following negative op-
erating performance whereas market power hypothesis implies positive stock returns
following positive operating performance in the post-acquisition period. This mutu-
ally exclusive set of competing hypotheses enables me to identify a valid hypothesis
by investigating post-acquisition stock returns and comparing operating performance,
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of rivals in the pre- and post-acquisition period.
1.5.1 Abnormal Stock Returns of Industry Rivals
I rst estimate the impact of re-sale on industry rivals' stock returns at the
announcement of a re-sale acquisition. To minimize other confounded eects in the
broad industry classication, I focus on target industry rivals in the same 4-digit
SIC code. I compare abnormal stock returns for industry rivals that share similar
characteristics with the target. Matched industry rivals are selected based on size
and market-to-book ratio. Among the subset of same industry rivals that have total
book asset values within 30% of the total book asset values of the target rm, I
choose a rival with the closest market-to-book ratio to that of the target. Rival's
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) at the announcement (-1, +1) of the acquisition
of an industry target is estimated using the Fama-French three-factor model. I use
240 daily returns covering (-300, -60) to estimate parameters for each rival rm.31
Panel A in Table 1.16 presents abnormal stock returns for industry rivals at the
announcement of acquisitions. The results show distressed target acquisitions in a
distressed industry to have a signicant impact on rivals' stock prices. Although their
CARs in the total sample are positive, rivals, in response to re-sale acquisitions, earn
-0.9% abnormal returns, on average, at the 5% signicance level (t-stat = -2.12). Fig-
ure 1.5 plots the equal-weighted average of short-term cumulative abnormal returns
of matched target rivals from 10 days before to 50 days after the announcement of ac-
quisitions. It also shows that matched target rivals of re-sale acquisitions experience
negative short-term returns relative to other rivals.
Previous results do not control for variables that could be driving the dierences.
I, therefore, turn to regression analysis and control for such factors including product
market variables. I estimate the re-sale eects on target industry rivals using the
following specications.
RTijdkt = 1(Ind.Dit  Distressit| {z }
Fire-Sale
) + 2Ind.Dit + 3Distressit + 
0
Xijdk + t + i + "ijdkt
where RTijdkt is the CAR for a matched industry rival of targets with same 4-digit SIC
over the three-day period (-1, +1) surrounding the announcement of acquisition, Xijdk
represents control variables for target i, acquirer j, rival k, and deal characteristics d.
The coecient estimates from the OLS regression in Table 1.17 show that the
31The results are robust after excluding the cases of multiple acquisitions occurring during the
estimation period.
27
interaction eect of a target's rm- and industry-level distress negatively aects the
stock returns of industry rivals. The coecient is large and signicant. The economic
magnitude of the coecient can be interpreted as 1-4 percentage points. These results
support both the negative information hypothesis and intense competition hypothe-
sis. Negative stock returns, however, do not allow me to determine whether the
negative contagion eects are related to the negative information or acquiring rms'
competitive advantage.
In the second matched sample test, I conduct subsample analysis with high and low
industry-level R&D intensity. The previous section shows that high R&D intensity
drives stronger re-sale eects by creating greater information asymmetry between
industry insiders and outsiders. If negative stock returns of target industry rivals
are not driven by re-sale eects, then there should be no dierence between the
stock market reactions of high and low R&D industries in this sub-sample. On the
other hand, if high information asymmetry in high R&D industries reinforces negative
information eects, then I should nd greater impact for target industry rivals in high
R&D industries. I show that the eects of a re-sale acquisition on target industry
rivals are stronger in high R&D industries. This evidence, therefore, supports the
negative information hypothesis. Models (3)-(6) in Table 1.17 reports the subsample
results. They reveal a signicant relation when industry-level R&D intensity is high,
but an insignicant relation when industry-level R&D intensity is low. The estimates
in Models (3)-(4) show -1.4% rivals' abnormal return for a one standard deviation
increase in Distress1T , or -5.97% decrease by Distress2T when the target industry is
distressed. These negative coecients are economically larger and statistically more
signicant than those of the full matched rival sample.
1.5.2 Operating Performance of Industry Rivals
I next examine matched industry rivals' operating performance by comparing
ROA and protability margin (operating cash ow/total sales) pre and post acqui-
sition, as presented in Panels B and C in Table 1.16. I nd that matched industry
rivals' ROA decrease by 0.007 in the total sample of acquisition, but increase in the
sample of re-sale acquisitions by 0.026. In Panel C of Table 1.16, protability margin
exhibits a slight negative change post acquisition. Figure 1.6 presents the operating
performance (ROA and prot margin) of matched target rivals from t-3 years to
t+3 years. The gure shows that matched rivals of re-sale targets experience an
insignicant decrease in operating performance during the post-acquisition period.
I next estimate the impact of acquisitions on industry rivals' operating perfor-
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mance using the following specications.
ROA-DiT = 1(Ind.Dit  Distressit| {z }
Fire-Sale
) + 2Ind.Dit + 3Distressit + 
0
Xijdk + t + i + "ijdkt
Prot-DiT = 1(Ind.Dit  Distressit| {z }
Fire-Sale
) + 2Ind.Dit + 3Distressit + 
0
Xijdk + t + i + "ijdkt
where ROA-DiTijkdt is the dierence of return on asset for industry rivals between the
average post-acquisition period (+3, +1) year and the average pre-acquisition period
(-3, -1) year, and Xijkd represents control variables for target i, acquirer j, rival k,
and deal characteristics d. The error terms are clustered by target, industry and year.
Prot-DiTijkdt is the dierence in protability margin (operating cash ow/total sales)
for industry rivals between the average post-acquisition period (+3, +1) year and the
average pre-acquisition period (-3, -1) year. The coecient estimates from the OLS
regression in Table 1.18 indicate that the interaction of a target's rm- and industry-
level distress has an insignicant eect on the post-acquisition operating performance
of industry rivals.
Taken together, industry rivals' negative abnormal stock returns unaccompanied
by diminished operating performance at announcements of acquisitions support Hy-
pothesis 5-1, which states that negative information from re-sale acquisitions causes
a negative contagion eect for industry rivals of re-sale targets.
1.6 Conclusion
Do re-sales exist in acquisitions? If they do, how do re-sale acquisitions aect
target industry competitors? This paper addresses these two important questions
by inferring the eect of the frictions involved in re-sale acquisitions from an ex-
amination of the combined impact of rm- and industry-level distress on acquisition
outcomes.
The main nding in this paper is that a target's rm- and industry-level distress is
a robust and economically important determinant of acquisition outcomes. In particu-
lar, the evidence suggests that distressed targets with nancially constrained industry
peers are sold at substantial discounts, as proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1992).
Acquirers gain positive and higher announcement returns in re-sale acquisitions and
re-sale targets are more likely to sell to outside acquirers. I demonstrate the re-sale
eects in acquisitions by showing that these ndings are stronger when re-sale tar-
gets are sold to industry outsiders or when targets' assets are highly industry-specic.
The results are robust to stock market undervaluation and economic recession. I also
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nd that re-sale acquisitions negatively aect target industry rivals' stock returns
by sending negative information without fundamental changes in product market
competition.
Overall, this study shows that nancial distress costs in an illiquid market are
substantial, particularly, when the assets are less redeployable. It highlights implica-
tions for debt capacity and capital structure as well as the contagion channel through
which economic shocks can transmit. The results suggest that information friction
creates ineciency in asset reallocation, which potentially slows recovery from reces-
sion. Direct government involvement through bailout being likely to create moral
hazard problem, government policy should instead encourage intensive corporate l-
ing and information sharing between banks as ways to improve selective screening
and increase the eciency of asset reallocation during downturns.
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CHAPTER II
Recourse Mortgage Law and the Housing Bubble
2.1 Introduction
1A bubble is dened as a mispricing of assets, associated with dramatic price
increases, that is not explained by fundamentals (Brunnermeier (2008)). Bubbles
burst at some point and trigger collapses in asset prices that potentially spread to
the banking system and the real economy. Understanding and identifying the mecha-
nisms that create bubbles in the housing market are thus central challenges that both
nancial economists and policymakers are facing. This paper builds on the previous
literature by showing that mortgage law plays an important role in the housing mar-
ket. In particular, the paper sheds light on the eects of recourse mortgage law on
housing price bubbles and mortgage lending by taking into account the growth of the
mortgage securitization market.
U.S. mortgage law varies from state to state. Among many provisions included
in mortgage law, recourse law governs lenders' right of deciency judgment when
borrowers default on mortgage loan payments.2 Borrowers in recourse states have
full liability for their mortgage loans because lenders, in the event that foreclosure
value is insucient to meet the debt obligation, are able to claim other assets. Lenders
in non-recourse states are precluded from doing this and so bear some costs. This
limited liability gives rise to the classic asset substitution problem in Allen and Gale
(2000a), whereby borrowers increase risky investments to the point of creating a
bubble by bidding up prices above fundamental values.
The primary goal of this paper is to analyze whether recourse law results in dif-
ferent magnitudes of housing price movement, with particular attention to identify-
ing bubbles. This question is important because the debate over recourse law has
1This essay represents joint work with Tongyob Nam (tynam@umich.edu) of the University of
Michigan.
2Figure 2.1 presents 11 states with non-recourse mortgage law.
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become increasingly controversial between scholars and policymakers (Pavlov and
Wachter (2004, 2006), Ghent and Kudlyak (2011), and Solomon and Minnes (2011))
and required extensive economic analysis to support housing system reform in many
countries.3 This paper focuses on a by-product of non-recourse law, namely, the social
cost incurred as a consequence of households exploiting it by shirking their contrac-
tual mortgage obligations. Our key hypothesis is that non-recourse law amplies
the housing price cycle by encouraging risk-shifting behaviors. Mortgage borrowers
in non-recourse states, because they can walk away when house values fall below
remaining mortgage amount (i.e., are \underwater"), have speculative motives to in-
crease their leverage and allocate more capital to risky assets in the housing market,
in the expectation of high housing appreciation in the future. If the non-recourse law
causes a larger increase beyond fundamentals during a period of economic expansion,
then during a crisis housing prices in non-recourse states are likely to experience a
larger drop than in recourse states.
If this households' investment incentive is well predicted, however, mortgage
lenders may behave dierently. The excessive risk-taking behavior in non-recourse
states can be prevented if mortgage loans are properly priced. More specically,
lenders can control the risk of borrower's default by means of low loan-to-value ra-
tios, high interest rates, and strict screening processes. Used appropriately, these
tools can forestall borrowers shifting risk and bidding up prices above their funda-
mental values. This raises empirical questions regarding whether lenders are aware
of additional risk in non-recourse states and what the net eects of recourse law on
housing prices and bubble creation are.
We also consider how the excessive lending from the banks' participation in the
originate-to-distribute (OTD) market interacts with non-recourse law during the
housing boom period of the early 2000s. We conjecture that the emergence of the
OTD model, together with credit expansion, enables lenders to eectively pass along
the risks and reduces the screening incentive ex-ante (i.e., Keys et al. (2010) and
Purnanandam (2011)), thereby promotes a disproportionately large increase in poor
quality loan originations in non-recourse states and amplies housing price cycle. This
two-stage risk-shifting hypothesis (from non-recourse households to lenders and from
lenders to the securitization market) predicts that more sub-prime mortgage loans
are originated in non-recourse than in recourse states and non-recourse states with
more sub-prime mortgage loans experience larger housing bubbles. We attempt to
3\Full Recourse Loans Won't Save Canada's Housing Market", 2013,
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100736121
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demonstrate the channel of the housing bubble using this cross-sectional variation in
risk-shifting intensity.
To test these arguments, rst, we empirically examine the eect of recourse law
on housing prices using a dierence-in-dierence framework that focuses on counties
that were disproportionately aected by the mortgage market collapse in 2007. To
show a causal relation, we use a contiguous border county-pair sample. This identi-
cation strategy allows us to estimate the eect of recourse law on housing bubbles
by controlling for fundamental asset value and unobserved spatial heterogeneity. Us-
ing ZIP code-level housing prices from Zillow Real Estate Research between 1998 and
2012, we nd evidence that housing prices in non-recourse states increase more during
housing market booms and drop more steeply during housing market recessions. The
economic impact of recourse law is large. Prior to the crisis, recourse states experi-
enced 9% annual growth and the crisis reduced the housing price growth rate by 3%.
But states with non-recourse law experienced 13% growth, and the corresponding
drop in housing prices was 6%. Such dierences in growth rates provide evidence of
the impact of recourse law. Controlling for the distance from state borders using ZIP
codes, we also nd that housing prices during the pre-crisis period increase abruptly
upon crossing from recourse states into non-recourse states whereas during the crisis
prices decrease abruptly.
We then identify the sources of larger housing bubbles in non-recourse states
by examining household asset allocation and leverage decisions (intensive margin).
During the housing market expansion, we nd that the average ratio of home equity
value to total household wealth is higher in non-recourse states by 7 percentage points.
In addition, mortgage borrowers in non-recourse states have higher debt-to-income
ratios by 1.74 percentage points. This higher leverage and greater asset allocation is
evidence that speculative motives of households in non-recourse states drive higher
housing price growth during economic expansion.
Having established the impact of recourse law on housing prices, we examine its
eect on mortgage lending behavior. For this analysis, we obtain single-family loan-
level origination data from two major Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporations,
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, at the 3-digit ZIP code-level and employ a state-
border discontinuity design with the contiguous border county-pair sample. We also
test the denial rate for loan applications from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA) to determine whether lenders' screening intensity varies. We nd evidence
that LTV ratio is lower whereas mortgage interest rates and denial rates are higher
in non-recourse states than in recourse states. These results imply that lenders in
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non-recourse states are aware of the additional risks embedded in non-recourse loans.
Lastly, we test the two-stage risk-shifting hypothesis by estimating the eect of
recourse law on the sub-prime mortgage ratio using HMDA data for 2003-2006. We
nd that lenders in non-recourse states originate, on average, 6% more sub-prime
loans than lenders in recourse states (extensive margin). Furthermore, non-recourse
states with high sub-prime loan ratios experience particularly large housing bubbles.
Taken together, these results suggest that the housing bubble is likely to be larger in
non-recourse states, because the OTD market and credit expansion dissuade lenders
from controlling the consequent risk.
The paper oers novel contributions to a growing literature on housing bubbles.
The extensive theoretical literature on bubbles notwithstanding, it remains empir-
ically challenging to quantify a speculative bubble from estimates of fundamental
economic value and distinguish a particular channel from many theoretical bubble
models. Our empirical setting oers the unique advantage of the state-border dis-
continuity test by means of which we control for changes in fundamental values and
examine whether the credit bubble is driven by investors' limited liability. We identify
the bubble channel through a comprehensive analysis of lending behavior and sub-
prime loan origination from the perspectives of both intensive and extensive margins
of speculative investment. The paper's results, although mainly relevant to the hous-
ing market, are generalizable to the asset bubble literature that attributes bubbles to
limited liability and the credit cycle.
This paper also has important implications for the housing price boom in the early
2000s. Previous literature attributes the housing boom to low, long-term real inter-
est rates managed by monetary policy (Himmelberg et al. (2005) and Taylor (2007)).
Other literature maintains that certain superstar cities experienced signicant housing
price appreciation due to an inelastic supply of land and growing number of high in-
come households (Glaeser et al. (2008) and Gyourko et al. (2013)), and Shiller (2007)
asserts that the real estate boom during this period was driven by a \social epidemic
of optimism" that encouraged speculative investment. Our contribution to this liter-
ature, the suggestion that mortgage law has a signicant impact on state variations
in housing investment behavior and price patterns, enhances our understanding of
cross-sectional variation in housing prices across states.
Several papers have examined the eect of recourse law on the mortgage default
rate. A recent paper by Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) shows that mortgage defaults are
more frequent in non-recourse states, but nd no evidence that mortgage interest rates
vary according to state laws. Pavlov and Wachter (2004, 2006) propose a model for
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the underpricing equilibrium of the put option embedded in non-recourse mortgage
lending. Our paper mainly diers from these studies in emphasizing the impact of
non-recourse law on the housing bubble and its interaction with mortgage lenders
taking into account the growth of the mortgage securitization market.
By providing some of the rst evidence of the combined eect of recourse law and
the securitization market on housing markets, this paper also expands previous re-
search on the recent mortgage crisis. Together with signicant credit expansion from
low interest rate policies, the role of the housing market preceding the crisis is high-
lighted (i.e., Herring and Wachter (2003), Reinhart and Rogo (2008, 2009), Mayer
et al. (2009), and Makarov and Plantin (2013)). Many studies have shown that sub-
prime mortgage expansion promoted the unsustainable growth that led to the collapse
of the market (Agarwal and Ben-David (2012), Berndt and Gupta (2009), Himmel-
berg et al. (2005), Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011), Jiang et al. (2010), Keys et al.
(2009, 2012), Mian and Su (2009) and Purnanandam (2011)). This paper further
extends previous research by showing how recourse law, through its inuence on bor-
rower risk-taking behavior, accounts for variations in sub-prime mortgage expansion
and the impact of the mortgage crisis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The origins of recourse law are
explored and hypotheses developed in Section 2. Sample data are described in Section
3. In Section 4, an empirical strategy is developed and the impact of recourse law on
housing prices is examined. In Section 5, we investigate the impact of recourse law on
household investment behavior. Mortgage lending behavior is investigated in Section
6 and the impact of recourse law on sub-prime mortgage expansion is analyzed in
Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2.2 Recourse Law and Hypotheses
2.2.1 Recourse Mortgage Law
2.2.1.1 Denition of Recourse Mortgage Law
U.S. mortgage law varies across states in many important ways. State-level mort-
gage law can be classied as recourse and non-recourse, depending on lenders' right of
deciency judgment when borrowers default on residential mortgage loans. Recourse
law permits lenders to claim, in other assets and salary, the dierence between a
remaining mortgage amount and the foreclosure value of a house. Non-recourse law
allows lenders to seize only the collateralized house in the event of a mortgage default.
Even though states are not strictly classied as recourse and non-recourse, it is
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widely accepted among both academics and practitioners that 11 states have non-
recourse mortgage laws.4 Figure 2.1 illustrates the classication of mortgage recourse
law in the U.S.5
2.2.1.2 Origins of Recourse Mortgage Law
State-level recourse law has changed little since its enactment during the Great
Depression of the 1930s. During that economic recession, foreclosure sales were su-
ciently intense and widespread to distort the housing market and caused houses to be
sold below their fundamental value. However, mortgage lenders sold borrowers' prop-
erties at a deep discount and then claimed deciency judgments for the full amount of
the debt, which amplied the depression. This prompted the anti-deciency judgment
legislation enacted in many states (Solomon and Minnes (2011)).
It is important to consider how states with non-recourse mortgage laws were cho-
sen. Selection on the basis of particular economic motives could imply an unobserved
factor responsible for both the legislation and recent housing market dynamics. To
mitigate concerns about reverse causality and omitted variable bias, we look to Ghent
(2013), who provides historical perspective on how individual states enacted diver-
gent foreclosure laws, in particular, the recourse provision, in the wake of the Great
Depression. The paper nds no clear economic or legal reasons why states developed
dierent procedures in the event of mortgage default. According toMian et al. (2013),
the dierences relate mainly to judges' idiosyncratic interpretations of case law. In
any case, that the dierences have persisted little changed since the 1930s mitigates
concerns about bias in our empirical results.
2.2.2 Hypothesis Development
We attempt to understand in this paper whether the magnitude of housing market
bubbles reects dierences between recourse and non-recourse laws. We hypothesize
that a larger bubble is created during a housing market boom, and a larger burst
experienced during a housing market recession, in non-recourse law states. The asset
substitution model by Allen and Gale (2000a) provides the theoretical rationale for
4There have been debates over the identication of non-recourse states between scholars. Zywicki
and Adamson (2009) argue that 15-20 states have non-recourse laws while Ghent and Kudlyak
(2011) estimate that eleven states have non-recourse laws. We mainly employ the classication
of Ghent and Kudlyak (2011). But we also check the robustness with the other classications.
http://www.foreclosurelaw.org/ provides a comprehensive description of state foreclosure laws in
the United States.
5In Appendix B, we also compare the recourse law with the judicial foreclosure requirement,
one of the major mortgage foreclosure laws that have been investigated in the literature. Figure 2.2
illustrates the classication of judicial requirement.
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borrowers with limited liability investing aggressively in risky assets and creating a
bubble by bidding up asset prices above their fundamental value.
Hypothesis 1: A state with non-recourse law creates a larger housing bubble during
an economic expansion, and experiences a steeper decline in housing prices during an
economic recession.
Specically, the micro foundation of this housing price pattern is likely to come
from household speculative behavior. The channels through which recourse law in-
uences household investment behavior can be divided into the leverage decision and
the asset allocation decision (intensive margin). Limited borrower's liability may
encourage households to invest in their house with a higher debt-to-income ratio be-
cause highly leveraged investments will enable them to increase their returns without
bearing additional downside risk. Additionally, households could dier in their asset
allocations depending on the recourse law of their states. We expect that households
in non-recourse states may allocate more capital to housing assets in anticipation of
higher returns in the future.
Hypothesis 2: Households in a state with non-recourse law 1) allocate more capital
on housing and 2) invest in housing assets with higher debt-to-income ratio than in
a state with recourse law.
Having established a role and the micro foundation for recourse law in housing
market bubbles, we turn to the question of whether mortgage lender behavior diers
between recourse and non-recourse law states. The Allen and Gale model assumes
the lending market to be competitive with unlimited credit supply, and lenders to not
observe the riskiness of assets. In practice, however, mortgage lenders can be con-
strained by market incompleteness, capital market frictions, and regulatory capital
requirements (Stein (2007)). Moreover, mortgage lenders can exercise some control
over the riskiness of lending through loan-to-value ratio (down payment), mortgage
spreads, and screening of borrowers. The corresponding hypothesis is that lenders in
non-recourse states, to minimize costs from the lack of deciency judgment, demand
a lower loan-to-value ratio (higher down payment), higher mortgage interest rate and
stricter loan screening than lenders in recourse states.
Hypothesis 3: Mortgage lenders in non-recourse states demand a lower loan-to-
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value ratio, and higher mortgage interest rate and have stricter loan screening than
mortgage lenders in recourse states.
This lending pattern is expected to be stronger for a property that is not a primary
residence, that is, for a second home or investment property. Non-pecuniary costs
that provide a disincentive to default even with limited liability include lowering of
the defaulter's credit rating and the utility loss of losing one's home and having to
move. We therefore expect households in non-recourse states to exhibit a stronger
speculative incentive when purchasing homes for investment purposes.
It will be surprising if we observe larger housing bubbles in non-recourse states
even in the presence of mortgage lenders' control of additional risk. Literature sug-
gests that the originate-to-distribute (OTD) market, by enabling mortgage lenders
to shift risk to other investors by securitizing mortgage loans and reselling them to
third parties, thereby mitigates constraints in credit supply and the ex-ante incentive
to screen borrowers (Keys et al. (2009, 2010), Keys et al. (2012) and Purnanandam
(2011)).6 It is likely that the origins of loans are concealed when loans are securitized
in a complex structure of nancial derivatives. Piskorski et al. (2013) argue that the
true quality of loans in the residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) market has
frequently been misreported to investors. They show that for one out of ten loans in
the RMBS market has misrepresentation in borrower occupancy status of borrowers
or second lien information, which is not priced in the securities at their issuance. To
the extent that it does not reect the embedded risk in non-recourse mortgage loans,
the OTD market promotes a disproportionately large increase in poor quality loan
originations in non-recourse states. This is consistent with the argument that the
OTD model induces excessively risky mortgage loan originations (Pennacchi (1988)
and Gorton and Pennacchi (1995)). The corresponding hypothesis is as follows.
Hypothesis 4: More sub-prime mortgage loans are originated in non-recourse than
in recourse states.
6Rapid expansion of this market was also accompanied by a relaxation of the regulation of
mortgage lending.
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2.3 Data
2.3.1 Housing Price Data
Housing market data used in this study are from Zillow Real Estate Research
(www.zillow.com). The Zillow database, widely used in related literatures7, provides
ZIP code-level housing price data at the monthly level from 1999-2013.8 The Zil-
low.com ZIP code-level data covers 45 states9 and 36,577 ZIP codes representing 78%
of U.S. ZIP codes. For each ZIP code, we use the median of sale prices scaled by a
home's square footage as a measure of housing price. This reduces the total sample
ZIP codes to 3700 major ZIP codes located in 38 states. Alternatively, we use the
median of the total prices of homes sold. We calculate the rate of annual growth in
housing price at time t based on the price in January in period t and t+1.
As another alternative measure for the housing bubble, we also employ the price-
to-rent ratio, which is a commonly used measure for housing valuation. This ratio
reects the relative cost of owning a house relative to the \fundamental value" of
asset, present value of future rental value. The housing price bubble may lead to an
unsustainably high price-to-rent ratio. We acquire median rent value from American
Community Survey data at the county level for the period of 2005-2011 and calculate
the growth rate.
2.3.2 Households Investment Behavior
We use single-family loan-level origination data from two major Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporations, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. This dataset has been
developed with the support of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to im-
prove transparency in the housing credit market and build a better credit performance
model. This dataset includes mortgage loans that are acquired by Freddie Mac and
Fannie Mae, which include 16 million loan originations from Freddie Mac and 18.7 mil-
lion mortgage loans from Fannie Mae, respectively.10 The data includes single-family
7i.e., Huang and Tang (2012), Guerrieri et al. (2013), and Mian et al. (2013)
8Our empirical results will be updated upon receipt of Census data from the American Housing
Survey (AHS) (which provides detailed, tract-level information about housing and household char-
acteristics including household-level panel data for each property), for which we have submitted a
request.
9Missing states: Alaska, Idaho, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Wyoming.
10Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase loans from approved mortgages sellers, then se-
curitize into MBS and sell to investors in the secondary mortgage market with the guarantee of
principal and interest payments. These agency MBSs, which are issued by government-sponsored
enterprises, account for approximately 60% of the total MBS market for the sample period. This
implies that the combined dataset from both primary Agency MBS players covers the majority of
39
mortgages acquired by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae from 1999-2012 and 2000-2012
with the following characteristics: 30-year xed-rate, fully amortizing, with full docu-
mentation, and conventional xed-rate.11 Data items are origination date, 3-digit ZIP
code, credit score, original loan amount, original interest rate, original loan-to-value
(LTV), debt-to-income ratio, loan purpose (purchase, cash-out renance, no cash-
out renance, renance non-specied), occupancy status (principal residence, second
home, investment property), and mortgage insurance.
In particular, we focus on debt-to-income (DTI) ratio and occupancy status. DTI
ratio is the sum of the borrowers' monthly debt payments divided by total monthly
income of borrower at the origination date. We calculate the 3-digit ZIP code level
average value of this variable. The occupancy status denotes whether the property
for mortgage is owner occupied, second home or investment property. Second home
and investment-purposed account for 5% of total data.
We then construct state-level asset allocations to housing assets. The Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) provides a wide range of household portfolio data includ-
ing total asset value, income, expenditure, and demographic information. The data
set is based on a survey that the PSID has conducted to more than 8000 house-
holds every two years. From the PSID data for the period 1999 to 2009, we estimate
household allocations on housing assets measured as the fraction of home equity to
total wealth. Home equity is the value of a house minus the rst and second mort-
gage on the house. Total wealth is the sum of home equity, farm/business assets,
checking/saving accounts, stocks, vehicles, annuities, other assets and other real es-
tate assets minus total debt. Examining the home equity share of each household in
dierent states enables us to understand how households response to the variation of
housing value during the period of the housing market bubble and burst.
2.3.3 Mortgage Lending Behavior
We obtain the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and interest rate from the Freddie Mac
and Fannie Mae loan purchase dataset. LTV is dened as the loan amount secured by
a mortgaged property on the origination date divided by the purchase price. Mortgage
interest rate is the annual percentage rate (APR) on mortgage loan. The mortgage
application can be denied by the nancial institution. The reasons for denial are
mortgage loan origination which will be securitized into the MBS market.
11This dataset does not include adjustable-rate mortgage loans, balloon mortgage loans, interest-
only mortgage loans, government-insured mortgage loans, or Home Aordable Renance Program
(HARP) mortgage loans. This also excludes loans with LTVs are greater than 97 percent, Alt-A
and other mortgage loans that are not available today.
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variously related to (1) debt-to-income ratio; (2) employment history; (3) credit his-
tory; (4) collateral; (5) insucient cash (downpayment, closing costs); (6) unveriable
information; (7) incomplete credit application; (8) denied mortgage insurance; and
(9) other. Because we aim to calculate the denial rate consequent to a high risk of
insolvency, we estimate the fraction of loan applications denied for reasons 1, 3, 4, or
5, listed above.
2.3.4 Proxy for Sub-prime loan ratio
As the HMDA data do not include an indicator for whether a given loan is sub-
prime, various methodologies for identifying sub-prime borrowers are employed in the
literature. We classify sub-prime loans based on lender identication. Using a list of
sub-prime lender specialists compiled annually by HUD12, we construct a sub-prime
ratio measure. Specically, it equals the number of sub-prime mortgage loans out
of the total number of mortgage loans originated. Other papers classify a loan as
sub-prime if the APR is three percentage points above a comparable Treasury APR
(i.e., if the mortgage spread is beyond three percentage points). However, following
HUD, this methodology potentially overestimates the sub-prime loan ratio. Mian and
Su (2009) identify as sub-prime those borrowers with a credit score below 660, a
threshold based on origination guidance provided by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.
2.3.5 Control Variables
To use the state-border discontinuity design, we need to construct a distance
measure for every ZIP code. We use ArcGIS software and the geodatabase provided
by Esri13 to estimate the shortest distance in miles between the centroid of each ZIP
code and the state border.
Other data used to supplement the mortgage information from the survey are
from the American Community Survey (ACS), the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA), and Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Complementary data from the ACS
provides socioeconomic characteristics of households including population, income
growth, and unemployment rate. This annual, county-level survey data is available
from 2005 to 2011. We also use FHFA's Monthly Interest Rate Survey (MIRS).
We also use MSA-level housing supply elasticity values provided by Saiz (2010).
This measure captures the restriction of housing expansion.
12U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/manu.html
13Esri is an international supplier of Geographic Information System software and geodatabase
management applications (http://www.esri.com/)
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2.3.6 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for key variables for our sample. The
average housing price growth rate per square foot is 6%, and the median is 5%.
This growth rate is higher than the average nominal GDP growth rate of 4%. It is
noteworthy that housing price growth has a large standard deviation (41%) during
our sample period as a result of the collapse of housing prices during the mortgage
crisis. The population growth is 1% and the unemployment rate is 5%, on average,
during our sample period.
Table 2.2 compares the main variables between recourse and non-recourse states.
We hypothesize that housing prices in non-recourse states rise more during an eco-
nomic expansion, and drop more steeply during an economic recession. In Panel A,
which compares recourse and non-recourse states in the pre-crisis period from 2003-
2006, non-recourse states are seen to have higher housing price growth, on average, by
4% annually, at the 1% signicance level. This is consistent with our hypothesis. On
the other hand, during the crisis period in our sample, housing prices show a larger
drop in non-recourse states. As can be seen in Panel B of Table 2.2, during the crisis
period (from 2007-2011), the housing price growth rate per square foot declined, on
average, by 3% annually in recourse, and 6% in non-recourse states.
Table 2.2 also presents the comparison of lending behaviors across states. Both
Panel A and Panel B of Table 2.2 shows that lenders in non-recourse states require
lower loan-to-value ratio and higher mortgage interest, which is also consistent with
Hypothesis 2.
2.4 Recourse Law and Housing Price Bubbles
Our rst set of tests investigates whether recourse law has an eect on housing
bubbles. Figure 2.3 presents the time-series behavior of the aggregate growth rate
of housing price (Panel A) and price-to-rent ratio growth (Panel B) in recourse and
non-recourse states. Although these growth rates move in a similar fashion, greater
swing is observed in non-recourse states in both Panel A and B. NBER classies the
periods from March 2001 to November 2001 and from December 2007 to June 2009
as recessionary periods. As can be seen in Panel A of Figure 2.3, the housing price
growth rate is higher during the pre-crisis period of 2002-2005, but falls below that
of recourse states during the recent crisis period from 2007-2011.14 It is also worth to
noting from 1998-2000 the housing price growth rate is higher in non-recourse than in
14The housing price growth rate declined sharply in 2006 but remained positive, which indicates
that housing prices peaked in 2006.
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recourse states, but drops more steeply during the rst recessionary period in 2001.
Panel B of Figure 2.3 also shows that the price-to-rent ratio remained positive and
higher in non-recourse state during the pre-crisis period but decreased more during
the crisis. Figure 2.3 shows a repeating pattern of a larger housing price swing in
non-recourse states. We next present the identication strategy for our tests and
report the results.
2.4.1 Empirical Design and Identication Strategy
Multiple complementary approaches are employed to identify a causal relation
between recourse law and housing price. The key prediction of the credit bubble
model is that housing price bubbles result from non-recourse law interacting with
an increasing credit supply. Two randomly selected locations, identical except for
recourse law status, provide an ideal empirical setting for our experiments. There
are, however, two challenges to examining the causal relation: (1) mortgage credit
supply, an important determinant of housing price15, is endogenously determined
with other factors, and (2) in the absence of a randomized experiment, unobserved
heterogeneity may lead to omitted variable bias.
We address these challenges by applying dierence-in-dierence specications that
exploit the nationwide credit supply shock of the mortgage market collapse in 2007
that aected states dierentially. The key identifying assumption is that the shock
induces a deviation from housing price trends that tracked together across both types
of states in the absence of the treatment. Figure 2.3 plots the similar trends in the
recourse (control group) and non-recourse (treatment group) states from which the
treatment eect drove a deviation in 2007. The annual nationwide housing price
growth rate was 12%-18% from 2002-2005, dropped to 1.5% in 2006, and turned
negative in 2007 and remained so until 2011. We therefore dene Crisis as a dummy
variable equal to zero before and including, and one after, the year 2006. If non-
recourse law causes a larger bubble in the housing market, the crisis may precipitate
a disproportionately larger drop in housing price in non-recourse states. Figure 2.3
shows the dierential impact of the crisis on housing price growth rate in recourse
and non-recourse states to be consistent with this argument. The identication of
ZIP codes disproportionately aected by the crisis enables us to estimate dierence-
15Credit supply is a main determinant of housing price and mortgage market dynamics that
explains the business cycle (Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997), Diamond and Rajan (2005)).
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in-dierence regressions as follow:
ln(Pit) = 0 + 1Non-recoursei + 2Crisist + 3Crisist  Non-recoursei +  0Xit + "it
where the dependent variable, ln(Pit), is the growth rate of housing price per square
foot in ZIP code i at time t from 2003-2011, Crisist is a dummy variable equal to zero
before and including 2006, and one after that year, Non-recoursei is a dummy variable
equal to one if ZIP code i is located in a non-recourse state, and zero otherwise.
In this specication, 1 captures the average dierence in housing price growth by
non-recourse law, whereas 2 captures the impact of crisis on housing price growth.
Our hypothesis predicts a positive sign on 1 and a negative sign on 2. Then, the
coecient of main interest is 3, which identies the impact of the crisis in non-
recourse states. Our hypothesis expects a negative sign on this coecient, or 3 < 0.
This dierence-in-dierence estimator suggests a causal relation between recourse
law and housing market bubbles. However, this estimator can be confounded if hous-
ing prices are aected dierently during the crisis for reasons unrelated to recourse
law. We address this problem by including the set of other state- and county-level
control variables, Xit, such as annual GDP growth, per capita income growth, popula-
tion growth rate, unemployment rate, MSA-level housing supply elasticity, and state
property tax that potentially aect demand and supply in the local housing market.
We also include a dummy variable for another major state-level mortgage foreclo-
sure law, Judicial Foreclosure, which represents a state law on judicial requirements
in the foreclosure process. Other literature (Pence (2006); and Mian et al. (2013))
emphasize that state-to-state variation in judicial foreclosure law is an important
determinant of mortgage credit and foreclosure rates.
More importantly, however, this regression is still unable to control for unob-
served spatial heterogeneity. Many other characteristics, such as a preference for
home-ownership, dwelling patterns, and state-specic laws and policies, may aect
the return on housing assets. Also, substantial heterogeneity may be observed in
housing and demography within large states.16 We control for unobserved spatial
heterogeneity by performing dierence-in-dierence regressions at the ZIP code-level
using the same explanatory variables, but focused on the counties close to a border
between states with dierent recourse laws. We include county-pair xed eects to
16For example, New York's Erie County and Westchester County have similar populations of
0.75 million, but median household income levels of $47,533 and $77,006, respectively, whereas
Connecticut's Faireld County is contiguous with, and has socioeconomic characteristics similar to
those of, Westchester county.
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capture county-pair specic characteristics. A number of studies have used the state
border eects methodology to explore how dierences in the socioeconomic environ-
ment aect various factors across counties and states (Holmes (1998); Pence (2006);
Dube et al. (2010); and Mian et al. (2013)).
We also examine the impact of recourse law by exploiting the discontinuity at
state borders. Our framework combines the strategy employed in Pence (2006) and
Mian et al. (2013) with a dierence-in-dierence setting that is less susceptible to
unobserved variation over time. For this analysis, we combine the ZIP code-level
housing price growth rate with distance information, specically, a measure of the
shortest distance between a state border and the centroid of a ZIP code. Using this
information and a recourse law indicator, we run the following regression:
ln(Pit) = 0 + 1Crisist + 2Non-recoursei + 3Crisist  Non-recoursei
+1Distance
R
i;b + 2Distance
NR
i;b + 3(Distance
R)2i;b + 4(Distance
NR)2i;b + 0Xit + i + "it
where ln(Pit) is the average growth rate of housing price in ZIP code i , and
Non-recoursei is an indicator that identies whether ZIP code i is located in a non-
recourse state. In the county-pair sample regression, we also includes distance mea-
sure from state-borders to focus on the jump at the state border, or discontinuity.
DistanceRi;b represents the interaction of distance and an indicator I(recourse), which
is zero for ZIP code i in non-recourse states. DistanceNRi;b represents the interaction
of distance and an indicator I(non-recourse). The squared distances for each state,
(DistanceR)2 and (DistanceNR)2, are also controlled. We include the county-pair
xed eect i to focus on the variation between two counties contiguous along a state
border. Standard errors are heteroskedasty consistent and clustered at the county
level.
The coecient on Non-recourse captures a sharp discontinuous change in housing
price when a border is crossed into a recourse state. Because we predict dierent
directions of jump before and after 2007, our main coecient of interest is 3. The
coecient on the interaction of Crisis and Non-recourse captures how discontinuous
changes at state borders are aected by the crisis. Our hypothesis predicts a positive
jump at the border in the pre-crisis period and negative jump during the crisis period,
which suggests 3 < 0.
There is a potential concern that some of the control variables are endogenously
determined with housing price Pit. For example, households who expect increases in
their property price may increase their consumption too. We address this possibility
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by performing the regression with lagged variables for time-varying controls.
We also examine the eect of recourse law on the housing bubble directly using
the price-to-rent growth rate in the pre-crisis period.
ln(Pit=Rit) = 0 + 1Crisist + 2Non-recoursei + 3Crisist  Non-recoursei + 0Xit + "it
where ln(Pit=Rit) is the average price-to-rent growth rate in ZIP code i , and Non-recoursei
is an indicator that identies whether ZIP code i is located in a non-recourse state.
2.4.2 Results
Models (1)-(2) in Table 2.3 estimate for the full sample with and without control
variables. The estimates show that housing price growth in non-recourse states is
higher than in recourse-states in the boom period but falls after the mortgage mar-
ket collapse. In particular, the estimated coecient on the interaction term shows
that housing prices dropped more during the crisis in non-recourse states. These two
changes produce a negative dierence-in-dierences, consistent with what we expect if
non-recourse states created a larger bubble. The economic magnitude of the interac-
tion eect is -6%, and the coecient is signicant at the 1% level. This indicates that
housing prices declined more by 6% annually in non-recourse states during the crisis
period. In Model (2), the coecient accounts for an approximately 6% further de-
crease in housing price relative to the pre-crisis period. It is also important to note the
stand-alone dummy variables, Crisis and Non-recourse. A negative and signicant
coecient on the Crisis dummy variable indicates that housing prices decreased sig-
nicantly following the crisis in 2007. On the other hand, a positive and signicant
coecient on the Non-recourse dummy variable indicates that housing prices have
grown higher by 2-3% annually in non-recourse states during the pre-crisis period.
In Models (3)-(5) of Table 2.3, we present results for the contiguous border county-
pair sample with the county-pair xed eect. This specication enables us to control
for unobserved spatial heterogeneity. We nd negative and signicant coecients
on the interaction term Crisis  Non-recourse in these models as well. The eco-
nomic magnitude of the estimate is 3-5%, which is lower than in the earlier models.
The coecient on the Crisis dummy variable is similar, but the coecient on the
Non-recourse dummy variable is larger in the county-pair sample.
In Model (4), we present the results of the state-border discontinuity model which
includes distance measure from state-borders. The main coecient of interest is
the interaction term Crisis  Non-recourse, which captures the eect of the crisis
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on discontinuous changes in housing price at state borders. Consistent with our
prediction, we nd a negative and signicant coecient on the interaction term. The
economic magnitude of the coecient is about 3%, and the coecient is signicant
at the 5% level. The results indicate that housing prices drop more during the crisis
in non-recourse than in recourse states, especially at state borders. By controlling
for distance, we establish that changes in housing price growth rate at state borders
are large and abrupt compared to within-border changes. Model (5) uses the lagged
variable for state-level time-varying controls such as GDP growth, income growth,
unemployment, and population growth. The coecients imply that our main results
are robust to the endogeneity problem between housing price growth and the control
variables.
In Table 2.4, we report the evidence of higher price-to-rent growth rates in non-
recourse states in the pre-crisis period 2005-2006. In Models (3)-(5), the results
show that non-recourse states experience higher appreciation of housing prices by 7-8
percentage points relative to the present value of future rental value or \fundamental
value" of the house.
The overall results provide support for our hypothesis that housing prices in non-
recourse states experience a larger bubble in boom periods and a larger burst in
recession periods.
2.5 Household Investment Behavior
In this section, we investigate the micro foundation of larger housing bubbles
in non-recourse states by examining the impact of recourse law on households' asset
allocation and leverage decisions. Our hypothesis predicts that households in non-
recourse states allocate more wealth to housing assets and have higher debt-to-income
ratio in housing purchases. Figure 2.4 provides evidence of the households' speculative
investment behavior. Panel A in Figure 2.4 plots the households' average ratio of
home equity to total wealth as a measure of asset allocation on the housing market.
Panel B shows the pattern of the average debt-to-income ratio at origination, dened
as the borrower's total monthly obligations divided by their monthly income. Figure
2.4 indicates that households in non-recourse states show signicantly higher asset
allocation and leverage ratio in their housing purchases. To identify a causal relation,
we employ a similar identication strategy as in the previous section but focus on the
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pre-crisis period. The corresponding regression specications are the following:
HouseShareit = 0 + 1Non-recoursei + 1Distance
R
i;b + 2Distance
NR
i;b
+3(Distance
R)2i;b + 4(Distance
NR)2i;b + 0Xit + i + "it;
DTIit = 0 + 1Non-recoursei + 1Distance
R
i;b + 2Distance
NR
i;b
+3(Distance
R)2i;b + 4(Distance
NR)2i;b + 0Xit + i + "it;
where HouseShareit is the average fraction of home equity value to total asset value
of a household at the state level in year t , and DTIit is the debt-to-income ratio,
or average borrower's total monthly obligations divided by their monthly income, at
loan origination in ZIP code i in year t . Non-recoursei is an indicator for whether
ZIP code i is located in a non-recourse state. We also include the county-pair xed
eect i and distance measures. Distance measures and other control variables are
described in the previous section. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and clustered at the county level.
In this specication, the coecient 1 on the non-recourse indicator shows that
the households' asset allocation and debt-to-income ratio change at the state borders
that dier in their recourse law, while the coecients 1 and 2 indicate how household
portfolio choice varies with distance in the recourse state direction and in the non-
recourse state direction. Our hypothesis predicts positive jumps in allocation of
household wealth to housing assets and higher leverage decisions when the border is
crossed from a recourse state to a non-recourse state, which corresponds to 1 > 0.
17
2.5.1 Results
Table 2.5 presents the coecient estimates of regressions of household investment
behavior for the contiguous border county-pair sample in the pre-crisis period from
2003-2006. Models (1)-(3) test for households' asset allocation using the average
ratio of home equity to total wealth at the state level as the dependent variable.
Models (4)-(6) test the leverage decision with the average debt-to-income ratio at
the ZIP code-level. The main coecient of interest is that on the Non-recourse
dummy variable, which captures the eect of limited liability in mortgage borrowing
17The current version of the analysis on household asset allocation is limited since the asset
allocation data is state-level and is not based on the origination date. The measure also depends
on the housing value. Our empirical results will be updated upon receipt of Census data from the
American Housing Survey (AHS).
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on household investment behavior.
Our hypothesis predicts that households in non-recourse states allocate a higher
fraction of capital to housing assets in anticipation of high housing appreciation in the
future, or sustained mispricing of assets. The estimates in Models (1)-(3) support this
hypothesis. The coecient on the non-recourse dummy is positive and statistically
signicant for the full sample (Model 1). Then, it becomes larger when we exam-
ine with the county-pair sample (Model 2) and remains positive and statistically
signicant when we employ the state-border discontinuity design with distance mea-
sures (Model 3). The economic magnitude of the coecient implies that households
in non-recourse states allocate 7% more wealth to home equity. Given the identi-
cal investment opportunities in nancial markets for both recourse and non-recourse
households, the dierence in portfolio choice supports the existence of speculative
investment motives of households in non-recourse states.
Table 2.5 also shows that households in non-recourse states tend to invest in
housing assets with higher debt-to-income ratios. We present the results for the full
sample in Model (4). Then, we focus on the contiguous border county-pair sample
with the county-pair xed eect in Model (5) and add distance measures to test
the state-border discontinuity in Model (6). The stand-alone Non-recourse dummy
in all of Models (4)-(6) shows positive estimates that are statistically signicant at
the 1 % level. In Model (6), the coecient estimate is 1.74%, which indicates that
households in non-recourse states borrow 1.74 percentage points more debt given the
same income. The discontinuous jump in their leverage decision at the state-border
provides evidence of speculative motives in their investment.
Taken together, these results suggest that housing prices experience larger bubbles
in non-recourse states than in recourse states because the risk-shifting feature of non-
recourse mortgage law leads households to allocate more wealth to housing assets and
invest in housing purchases with higher leverage.
2.6 Mortgage Lending Behavior
In this section, we examine the impact of recourse law on mortgage lending
behavior. In the risk-shifting model developed by Allen and Gale (2000a), lenders
are unable to monitor the types of assets invested in by borrowers and have limited
means to control the risk of default. Lenders in the real mortgage market, however,
are able to control the risk of default by means of lower loan-to-value ratios (higher
down payment), higher mortgage interest rates, and stricter screening. We conjecture
that mortgage lenders in non-recourse states could eectively respond to borrowers'
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riskier investment behaviors.
In particular, we highlight initial LTV ratio at the time of mortgage origination.
While higher mortgage interest rates can potentially raise the mortgage default prob-
ability and subsequently lenders' expense from default, a low LTV ratio eectively
decreases the probability of negative home equity.18 Figure 2.5 plots the mortgage
lending behaviors in recourse and non-recourse states. Panel A plots the average
LTV ratio, dened as the loan amount secured by a mortgaged property on the orig-
ination date divided by the purchase price. It shows that the average LTV ratio in
recourse states holds near the conventional median of 80% throughout the sample
period whereas the average LTV ratio in non-recourse states remains considerably
lower than in recourse states. This LTV pattern in non-recourse states is expected to
be stronger for households whose occupancy status for the properties are not primary
residence because they have less non-monetary utility loss from strategic default.
Panel B of Figure 2.5, which plots the average loan-to-value ratio for a group of bor-
rowers whose occupancy status is either second home or investment property, provides
evidence in support of our hypothesis during the pre-crisis period.
To further test this insight, we examine our hypothesis using the state border
discontinuity regression for the pre-crisis period 2003-2006.
LTVit = 0 + 1Non-recoursei + 1Distance
R
i;b + 2Distance
NR
i;b
+3(Distance
R)2i;b + 4(Distance
NR)2i;b + 0Xit + i + "it;
where
LTV =
Amount of mortgage when acquired
Purchase price of unit
and Non-recoursei is an indicator that identies whether ZIP code i is located in a
non-recourse state. Distance measures and other control variables are described in
the previous section. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered
at the county level. Hypothesis 3 predicts a negative jump in the LTV ratio at the
border when one crosses into a non-recourse state, which suggests 1 < 0. Then, we
divide home purchases into residential-purpose transactions and investment-purpose
transactions based on the occupancy status, and examine whether non-recourse drives
stronger eects in investment-purpose properties.
We also test whether average interest rates and average denial rates for loan
18A non-recourse mortgage loan with a high down payment can be considered as a put option in
deep out-of-the money.
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applications dier over the recourse law. Our hypothesis predicts that both interest
rates and denial rates are higher in non-recourse states because lenders require higher
interest rates and stricter screening to control the additional risk. The regression
specications for these tests are the following:
Interestit = 0 + 1Non-recoursei + 1Distance
R
i;b + 2Distance
NR
i;b
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NR)2i;b + 0Xit + i + "it;
Denial Rateit = 0 + 1Non-recoursei + 1Distance
R
i;b + 2Distance
NR
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R)2i;b + 4(Distance
NR)2i;b + 0Xit + i + "it;
where Interestit is mortgage interest, the annual percentage rate (APR) on mortgage
loans in ZIP code i at year t and Denial Rateit is the average denial rate in ZIP code-
level. Denial rate is dened in Section 3.3. Our main hypothesis predicts a positive
jump of both the mortgage interest rate and the denial rate at the border when one
crosses into the non-recourse states, corresponding to 1 > 0.
2.6.1 Results
Table 2.6 test the hypothesis that 1 < 0. If lenders are unable to control
the additional risk in non-recourse states through the LTV ratio, then 1 will not
equal zero. Model (1) estimates the non-recourse dummy on a LTV ratio for the
full sample in the pre-crisis period. The estimated coecient presents the negative
relationship between non-recourse law and LTV ratio. Estimates show that non-
recourse law is associated with a LTV ratio decrease of 3.3 percentage points. This
is signicant relative to the standard deviation of LTV ratio across this period of 4
percentage points. In Models (2)-(3), estimates of 1 remains robust with the county-
pair sample with and without the distance measure suggesting evidence of lender's
dierent behavior.
Models (4)-(6) of Table 2.6 focus on second home or investment-purpose properties
with which households are more likely to take advantage of their limited liability in
mortgage borrowing. In each model, the magnitudes of the coecient estimates are
larger and more signicant relative to the comparable estimates in Models (1)-(3).
This is consistent with our prediction.
Table 2.7 estimates the impact of recourse law on mortgage lending behaviors
including the mortgage interest rate and denial rate. This analysis is based on the pre-
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crisis sample because the eect of the mortgage market collapse on mortgage interest
rates is unclear as government policy and decreased demand in the housing market
are confounded in the result.19 We estimate the eect of recourse law on mortgage
interest (%) for the full sample in Model (1), and for the county-pair sample in Models
(2)-(3). The estimates present insignicant coecients on the Non-recourse dummy
in Models (1). But in our preferred Models (2) and (3) with state-border discontinuity
regression, we nd that the coecient on Non-recourse is positive and statistically
signicant at the 1% level, which implies a positive jump in mortgage spread when
the border is crossed from a recourse state into a non-recourse state.
Models (4)-(6) in Table 2.7 estimate the impact of recourse law on the denial
rate for loan applications using the contiguous state border county-pair sample in
the pre-crisis period. While the stand-alone Non-recourse dummy in Model (4) has a
positive but statistically insignicant coecient, it becomes positive when we focus
on county-pair sample in Model (5) and remains signicantly positive in our preferred
state-border discontinuity model in Column (6). In Model (6), the coecient estimate
is 7%, which indicates that households in non-recourse states are more likely to be
denied, on average, by 7 percentage points. The size is economically meaningful
considering that the average denial rate is 17% in the aggregate economy.
The overall results suggest that mortgage lenders are aware of the additional risk
embedded in non-recourse mortgage loans, and so charge higher interest rates and
deny loan applications more frequently. The next question of this paper is then,
why larger housing bubbles are observed in non-recourse states despite the lenders'
exercise of control for the additional risk.
2.7 Recourse Eects on Sub-prime Mortgage
We conjecture that the surprising nding that housing prices experience larger
bubbles in non-recourse states in the presence of lenders' control is attributable to
the emergence of the OTD market, which enables lenders to eectively shift the risk
of those costs to other investors. In other words, mortgage lending behavior does
not fully reect the higher risk in non-recourse states. Our two-stage risk-shifting
hypothesis predicts that 1) more sub-prime mortgage loans are originated in non-
recourse than in recourse states and 2) the eect of non-recourse law on housing
bubbles should be larger in a state where the sub-prime ratio is high.
19One caveat to analyzing the interest rate and the denial rate is that they are also likely to be
biased by dierent selections of loan applicants. To address this issue, we perform the regression
after controlling for applicants' credit score and income level aggregated at the 3-digit ZIP code level
and nd robust results.
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Figure 2.7 presents the time-series trend of the aggregate sub-prime ratio in both
recourse and non-recourse states. Like the time-series pattern of housing price growth
rate, these sub-prime ratios move in a similar pattern over time, but greater volatility
is observed in non-recourse states. Consistent with our hypothesis, the sub-prime
loan ratio in non-recourse states is higher during the pre-crisis period of 2002-2005
and peaks at a similar level in 2006, but falls below that in recourse states during the
recent crisis period from 2007.
To test this relation, we rst estimate the recourse eect on the sub-prime mort-
gage ratio, calculated as the number of sub-prime mortgage loans divided by the total
number of mortgage loans originated using the specication in below.
Sub-primeit = 0 + 1Non-recoursei + 1Distance
R
i;b + 2Distance
NR
i;b
+3(Distance
R)2i;b + 4(Distance
NR)2i;b + 0Xit + i + "it;
where Sub-primeit is the aggregate ratio of sub-prime loan originations to total num-
ber of loan originations in ZIP code i at time t . Distance measures and other control
variables are described in the previous section. Standard errors are robust to het-
eroskedasticity and clustered at the county level. Our main hypothesis predicts a
positive jump in the sub-prime loan ratio at the border when one crosses into a
non-recourse state, corresponding to 1 > 0.
We provide evidence of a causal relation on this hypothesis by employing the
dierence-in-dierence approach using the shock of the mortgage market collapse in
2007, which aected some states more than others. We run the following regression:
Sub-primeit = 0 + 1Non-recoursei + 2Crisist + 3Crisist  Non-recoursei
+1Distance
R
i;b + 2Distance
NR
i;b + 3(Distance
R)2i;b + 4(Distance
NR)2i;b + 0Xit + i + "it
where Crisist is a dummy variable equal to zero before and including 2006, and one
after that year. The coecient of main interest is 3, which captures the impact of
the crisis in non-recourse states. Our hypothesis expects greater decline in the sub-
prime loan ratio in non-recourse states, which would imply a negative sign on this
coecient, or 3 < 0.
To further test whether subprime lending plays an important role as a channel
for larger housing price swing in non-recourse states, we test the interaction eect
of Non-recourse dummy variable and Sub-primeit on the housing price growth rate.
Our two-stage risk-shifting hypothesis predicts that the eect of non-recourse law on
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housing bubbles should be larger in states where the sub-prime ratio is high.
ln(Pit) = 0 + 1Non-recoursei + 2Sub-primeit + 3Non-recoursei  Sub-primeit
+1Distance
R
i;b + 2Distance
NR
i;b + 3(Distance
R)2i;b + 4(Distance
NR)2i;b + 0Xit + i + "it
where the dependent variable is the growth rate of housing price per square foot in
ZIP code i at year t . The interaction term between Sub-primeit and Non-recoursei
is the main variable of interest. Our hypothesis predicts positive coecient on this
coecient, or 3 > 0.
2.7.1 Results
Table 2.8 presents the results of the regression estimation for the sub-prime loan
ratio. In Models (1)-(3), we focus on the pre-crisis period of 2003-2006. We use
the contiguous border county-pair sample with control variables in Model (2). We
add distance measures in Model (3) to test the state-border discontinuity. In Model
(1) with the full sample, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that 1 for
the Non-recourse dummy variable equals zero. However, the results in our preferred
Models (2)-(3) show that a larger fraction of sub-prime loans is originated in non-
recourse states than in recourse states. The coecients on the Non-recourse dummy
variable in Model (2) is positive and statistically signicant at the 1% level. The
economic magnitude of this eect is 8%. We also nd consistent results from the
state border discontinuity test. The results show that lenders in non-recourse states
originate 6 percentage points more sub-prime loans than lenders in recourse states.
This eect is economically signicant considering that the average sub-prime loan
ratio for the sample period is approximately 17-18 %. These results are consistent
with our hypothesis, which states that the OTD market encourages more risk shifting
by lenders in non-recourse states than by lenders in recourse states.
To further test this insight, we test the relation using the dierence-in-dierence
specication. Models (4)-(6) in Table 2.8 present the regression results. A negative
and signicant coecient on the Crisis dummy variable indicates that the sub-prime
loan ratio declined signicantly following the crisis in 2007. In Models (5)-(6), the
coecient accounts for a 7 percentage point decrease in the sub-prime loan ratio rela-
tive to the pre-crisis period. More importantly, the interaction eect of Non-recourse
and Crisis shows a negative coecient at the 1% signicance level. The evidence in-
dicates that the mortgage market collapse in 2007 aected non-recourse states more
than recourse states. The stand-alone variable Non-recourse remains positive but
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becomes statistically insignicant.
We next examine whether non-recourse law interacting with sub-prime lending
drives a larger housing price in non-recourse states. This test emphasizes a channel
through which a larger housing bubble can be created in non-recourse states. In Table
2.9, we report the interaction eect of Non-recourse dummy variable and Sub-primeit
on the housing price growth rate. We employ the full sample for the pre-crisis period
of 2003-2006 in Models (1)-(2) and then focus on the contiguous border county-pair
sample in Models (3)-(4).
As examined in the sub-prime literature, Sub-primeit is positively associated with
housing price growth rate in our specications. More importantly, in all Models
(1)-(4), we nd positive and signicant coecients on the interaction term, which is
consistent with our hypothesis. The economic magnitude of this eect can be inter-
preted as 0.9-2.5 percentage points higher housing price growth with a one standard
deviation increase in the sub-prime loan ratio.20 The individual coecients for each
control variable are generally in the right direction.
It is important to note that the coecient on the stand-alone variable ofNon-recourse
remains signicant with positive coecient estimates. Combined with the ndings
on households' investment behavior in Section 5, these results suggests that non-
recourse law drives a higher housing bubble through both the extensive margin from
more sub-prime loan origination and the intensive margin from households' higher
leverage decision.
Our overall results demonstrate an underlying mechanism in the recent housing
bubbles and, in particular, why we observe larger bubbles in non-recourse states.
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the role of state-level variation in mortgage recourse
law in the creation of a bubble in the housing market. We perform on contiguous state
border pair-counties a state border discontinuity test combined with a dierence-in-
dierence setting using the mortgage market collapse in 2007 as an exogenous shock.
The results, which are economically large and robust, show that states with non-
recourse law experience a larger bubble and burst in housing prices. Our evidence
supports the bubble mechanism by the asset substitution problem, as proposed by
Allen and Gale (2000a). We also examine the eect of recourse law on lending be-
20The standard deviation of the sub-prime loan ratio is 0.13 for the sample period. The economic
magnitude is calculated by 0.13*0.19= 0.025 in Model (1) and 0.13*0.07 = 0.009 in Models (3) and
(4).
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havior. Although we nd evidence that mortgage lenders are aware of the additional
risk inherent in non-recourse loans, the higher sub-prime loan ratio in non-recourse
states suggests that the OTD market enables lenders to eectively shift the risk to
other investors.
The bubble and burst cycle in the housing market has been repeated and ampli-
ed in non-recourse states. Although recourse mortgage law has been adopted by
most European countries and Canada, China, and Japan, it has become a subject of
heated debate in relation to housing market reform. This paper identies important
implications for the evaluation of recourse mortgage law with respect to preventing
future housing market crises and collapse. Non-recourse law, while protecting house-
holds from premature foreclosures and lenders' deciency judgments, causes larger
swings in housing prices as a result of being exploited by households to make riskier
investments when housing markets are in a boom cycle.
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APPENDIX A
Fire-Sale Acquisitions and Intra-Industry
Contagion
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Figure 1.1: Components of Corporate Sector Asset Reallocation
This graph shows the components of corporate sector asset reallocation in billions of dollars be-
tween 1980 and 2010. The solid line denotes the total annual amount of asset reallocation: sum of
acquisitions (Compustat: AQC) and sales of property, plant and equipment (Compustat: SPPE).
The dotted line denotes total acquisitions of all rms in Compustat. The dashed line denotes sales
of property, plant and equipment of all rms in Compustat. This graph shows that acquisitions
account for around two-thirds of asset reallocation.
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Figure 1.2: Financial Frictions and Fire-Sale
This graph shows the impact of a negative industry-wide shock on the secondary market for corporate
assets. In a world without nancial frictions, corporate assets are traded based on the future cash
ows from the assets. A negative industry-wide shock drives price to fall from P0 to P1, which reects
the updated value of the assets, by shifting the supply (S) and demand (D) curves. With nancial
frictions, however, more rms within the industry are likely to be nancially constrained due to an
industry-wide debt overhang problem. Moreover, given that the assets are fairly specialized to the
industry, industry outsiders with high liquidity have lower valuations of the assets due to frictions
in capital allocation across industries. Thus, demand decreases further from D1 to DFS and supply
increases further from S1 to SFS , which reduces the market price to PFS , the re-sale price.
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Figure 1.3: Long-term Abnormal Returns for Acquirers
This gure shows the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of acquirers from 20 days before to 200
days after the announcement of acquisitions. The solid line shows CARs for acquirers of a distressed
target in a distressed industry, or re-sale acquisition. The dotted line shows CARs for acquirers
of a distressed target in a non-distressed industry. The dashed line shows CARs for acquirers of a
non-distressed target in a non-distressed industry. Abnormal returns are calculated as the acquirer's
return minus a value-weighted market index.
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Figure 1.4: Short-term Abnormal Returns for Acquirers
This gure shows the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of acquirers over three days surrounding
the announcement (-1,+1) using Fama-French three-factor model. The red dots show the CARs of
acquirers when targets are in distressed industries, and the navy pluses are when targets are in non-
distressed industries. The black solid line and navy dashed line show the tted values of observations
in distressed industries and non-distressed industries, respectively. Industry is dened as distressed
if median sales growth is negative. The gray area shows the 95% condence interval. Target rm
distress measure (EDF) is a continuous measure, Distress1T , based on distance-to-default model.
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Figure 1.5: Abnormal Returns for Target Industry Rivals
This gure shows the short-term cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of target industry rivals from
10 days before to 50 days after the announcement of acquisitions. The solid line shows CARs for
acquirers of a distressed target in a distressed industry, or re-sale acquisition. The dotted line
shows CARs for acquirers of a distressed target in a non-distressed industry. The dashed line shows
CARs for acquirers of a non-distressed target in a non-distressed industry. Abnormal returns are
calculated as the acquirer's return minus a value-weighted market index.
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Figure 1.6: Operating Performance of Target Rivals
These gures show the operating performance of target industry rivals from t-3 year to t+3 year
around the announcement of acquisition. Figure (a) shows median ROA (net income/total assets)
and gure (b) shows median prot margin (operating cash ow/total sales).
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Table 1.1: Variable Denitions
Variable Description Source
Distress1T EDF index from Distance-to-Default model (Merton (1974)) COMPUSTAT,
CRSP
Distress2T Dummy equal to one if leverage > industry median and current
ratio < industry median
COMPUSTAT
Ind:DistressT Dummy equal to one if median sales growth is negative COMPUSTAT
CAR(-1, +1) Cumulative abnormal returns over three days surrounding the
announcement (-1, +1) using Fama-French three-factor model
CRSP
BHARA The acquirer's buy-and-hold returns during 2 years following
acquisition less the buy-and-hold return of a matched rm
COMPUSTAT,
CRSP
Ln(Price1) The log of total equity value (EQVAL) SDC
Ln(Price2) The log of total transaction value (TRANSACT) SDC
Premium Oer price (PR) divided by target stock price 4 weeks before
the announcement (SPRC 4WK)
SDC
CARCombined The marget equity value weighted average of the target's CAR
and acquirer's CAR
COMPUSTAT,
CRSP
Log(Synergy) The log of the sum of the acquirer's and target's abnormal
dollar return (CAR*market cap.)
COMPUSTAT,
CRSP
DCAR CAR(-1, +1) times market equity value 4 weeks prior to the
announcement
SDC
NDCAR (!T ) (DCART - DCARA)/(target mkt cap. + acquirer mkt cap.) Ahern (2011)
BargainT DCART /(DCART +DCARA ) CRSP
Outsider Dummy equal to one if the acquirer's 3-digit SIC code is dif-
ferent from the target's
COMPUSTAT
Capital-Specicity 1 - (used capital expenditure within an industry/aggregate in-
dustry capital expenditure), Balasubramanian and Sivadasan
(2009)
Labor Union Percentage of labor union membership in 3-digit SIC code,
Hirsch and Macpherson (2002)
R&D Intensity Research and development expense divided by total sales COMPUSTAT
Size Log of market capitalization 4 weeks before announcement CRSP
Market-to-book Market value of total assets divided by book value assets COMPUSTAT,
CRSP
Leverage Total debt (Debt in current liabilities + long-term debt) di-
vided by total book assets
COMPUSTAT
Tangibility (Total assets - Intangible assets)/Total assets COMPUSTAT
Protability Operating income after depreciation divided by total sales
(Prot margin)
COMPUSTAT
Same Industry Dummy equal to one if target and acquirer in the same 3-digit
SIC code
COMPUSTAT
Tender Oer Dummy equal to one if acquirers issue tender oer SDC
Toehold The percentage of shares held by the acquirer at the acquisition
announcement
SDC
Competing Dummy equal to one if the acquirer had to make a counter-oer SDC
Poison Pill Dummy equal to one if the target has poison pill provision
Termination Fee Dummy equal to one if the merger agreement includes a target
termination fee
SDC
Recession NBER dened recession NBER
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics: Target and Acquirer
This table presents the summary statistics for the U.S. acquisitions completed between 1980 and
2010 in which the publicly traded acquiring rm gains control of a public target as listed by SDC.
Panels A and B provide pre-acquisition characteristics of target and acquirer, respectively. All
variables are dened in Table 1.1.
Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max Obs.
Panel A. Target Characteristics
Distress1T 0.111 0.001 0.227 0.000 0.998 1572
Industry Distress 0.074 0.000 0.262 0.000 1.000 1572
Log (Assets) 11.78 11.66 1.644 7.183 17.60 1572
Log (Equity) 5.282 5.201 1.721 0.096 11.27 1572
Market/Book 2.087 1.479 2.018 0.297 28.40 1572
Cash 0.228 0.135 0.236 0.000 0.970 1572
Leverage 0.181 0.127 0.184 0.000 0.929 1572
Protability -0.198 0.095 1.671 -20.78 0.618 1556
Tangibility 0.892 0.972 0.159 0.171 1.000 1334
Industry Q 1.765 1.619 0.652 0.756 7.184 1572
Industry Leverage 0.147 0.120 0.119 0.000 0.663 1572
Capital-Specicity 0.937 0.940 0.033 0.786 1.000 866
Union Membership 9.560 5.700 10.909 0.000 78.40 1495
R&D Intensity 0.107 0.074 0.161 0.000 1.093 1513
Panel B. Acquirer Characteristics
EDF 0.052 0.000 0.160 0.000 1.000 1427
Industry Distress 0.082 0.000 0.275 0.000 1.000 1569
Log (Assets) 14.17 14.11 2.092 7.632 19.82 1572
Log (Equity) 7.829 7.756 2.210 1.148 13.37 1572
Market/Book 2.505 1.807 2.675 0.354 58.04 1572
Cash 0.177 0.109 0.186 0.000 0.981 1572
Leverage 0.198 0.179 0.161 0.000 0.869 1572
Protability 0.100 0.159 1.467 -55.09 0.812 1571
Tangibility 0.852 0.921 0.174 0.080 1.000 1313
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Table 1.3: Summary statistics: Deal Characteristics
This table presents the summary statistics for key deal characteristics for the U.S. acquisitions
completed between 1980 and 2010 in which the publicly traded acquiring rm gains control of a
public target as listed by SDC. A rm's industry is dened as the set of rms with the same 3-digit
SIC code. All variables are dened in Table 1.1.
Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max Obs.
Ln (Price1) 5.388 5.286 1.779 -1.808 11.39 1566
Ln (Price2) 5.404 5.325 1.752 -0.511 11.40 1572
Premium 0.504 0.377 0.934 -0.628 19.94 933
Relative Size 0.841 0.848 0.120 0.500 1.511 1572
Tender Oer 0.254 0.000 0.435 0.000 1.000 1572
Toehold 0.032 0.000 0.130 0.000 0.982 1572
Competing Bidder 0.050 0.000 0.217 0.000 1.000 1572
Cash Payment 0.373 0.000 0.484 0.000 1.000 1572
Stock Payment 0.280 0.000 0.449 0.000 1.000 1572
Termination Fee 0.601 1.000 0.490 0.000 1.000 1497
Same Industry 0.539 1.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 1572
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Table 1.4: Eects of Fire-Sale on Acquirer Return: Univariate Analysis
This table compares acquirer returns over target rm- and industry-distress. Panel A compares
the cumulative abnormal returns (CARA (%)) of acquirers over target rm- and industry-distress.
Panel B compares the buy-and-hold returns (BHARA (%)) during the two years following the
acquisition, less the buy-and-hold return of a matched rm. CARs are presented for the (-1, +1)
window surrounding the announcement of acquisitions. Target is classied as distressed, based
on Distress1T , if the rm's EDF index is greater than the median of the entire merger sample.
Industry is dened as distressed, based on a dummy variable Ind:DistressT . The industry of a
rm is dened as the set of rms with the same 3-digit SIC code. Coecients marked ***, ** and
* are signicant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
All Distressed Target Non-distressed Target
- Dist. Ind. Non-dist. Ind. Dist. Ind. Non-dist. Ind.
Panel A. CARA(%)
Mean -0.88*** -0.92 -1.04*** -0.94 -0.75***
Median -0.57 -1.22 -0.89 -0.56 -0.33
Std. Dev. 7.30 6.56 8.02 7.28 6.82
Number of Obs. 2409 80 912 100 1317
Panel B. BHARA(%)
Mean -11.11*** 4.10 -9.90*** -25.60* -11.80***
Median -6.57 0.70 -7.10 -15.90 -6.20
Std. Dev. 77.08 78.40 81.00 120.00 70.70
Number of Obs. 1651 52 611 58 930
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Table 1.5: Eects of Fire-Sale on Acquirer Returns: Multivariate Analysis
This table presents the impact of re-sale on short-run and long-run abnormal returns for acquirers.
We specify a regression model:
Yijdt = 1(Ind.Dit Distressit| {z }
Fire-Sale
) + 2Ind.Dit + 3Distressit + 
0
Xijd + t + i + "ijdt (A.1)
where Distressit and Ind:Dit are the target rm and industry distress measures, respectively,
of target i, and Xijd represents control variables for target i, acquirer j, and deal characteristics
d. Year xed eect (t) and industry xed eect (i) are also included. In Models (1)-(2), the
dependent variable is acquirer's three-day cumulative abnormal return (CARA) at announcement of
acquisition, estimated using a market model. In Models (3)-(4), the dependent variable is acquirer's
buy-and-hold returns (BHARA) during 2 years following acquisition less buy-and-hold return of a
matched rm. The variable of interest is Fire-Sale | the interaction between target rm distress
(Distress1T , Distress2T ) and industry-level distress (Ind:DistressT ). Ind:DistressT is a dummy
that equals 1 if the sales growth of the median rm in an industry is negative in the year of the
transaction. Control variables for acquirer characteristics are size, leverage, m=b, tangibility,
and profitability. Deal-specic controls include same industry, tender oer, toehold, competing,
poison pill, and termination fee. Industry xed eects are at the 3-digit SIC code level. Other
variables are dened in Table 1.1. Robust standard errors clustered at year-industry are reported
in parentheses. Coecients marked ***, ** and * are signicant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Dep. variable: CARA BHARA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fire-Sale1 0.11*** 1.01*
(0.03) (0.53)
Fire-Sale2 0.05*** 0.82***
(0.01) (0.19)
Ind:DistressT 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.09
(0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.08)
Distress1T -0.01 -0.10
(0.01) (0.17)
Distress2T 0.01 -0.07
(0.01) (0.06)
Med. Ind. Q 0.01** 0.01** 0.04 0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.09)
Med. Ind. Leverage 0.01 0.01 1.45 1.52
(0.05) (0.05) (1.16) (1.17)
Target Size -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.05*** -0.05**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
Target Leverage -0.00 -0.02 -0.32* -0.30*
(0.01) (0.02) (0.17) (0.17)
Target M/B -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
Target Tangibility 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.19) (0.18)
Target Protability 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Control: Acq. & Deal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1098 1098 776 776
Adj-R2 0.08 0.07 0.16 0.16
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Table 1.6: Eects of Fire-Sale on Target Oer Price
This table tests for the impact of re-sale on target oer price. The dependent variables are three
dierent measures of oer price for target shareholders from the SDC database, dened as follows:
Ln(Price1): the log of total equity value, Ln(Price2): the log of total transaction value, and
Premium: per share oer price divided by target stock price four weeks before the announcement.
The variable of interest is Fire-Sale | the interaction between target rm distress (Distress1T ,
Distress2T ) and industry-level distress (Ind:DistressT ). Industry xed eects are at the 3-digit
SIC code level. Control variables are described in Table 1.5 and a detailed description of each
variable is included in Table 1.1. Robust standard errors clustered at year-industry are reported
in parentheses. Coecients marked ***, ** and * are signicant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Dep. variable: Oer Price Ln(Price1) Ln(Price2) Premium
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fire-Sale1 -0.89* -0.50*** -0.76***
(0.49) (0.13) (0.24)
Fire-Sale2 -0.24 -0.24* -0.28**
(0.22) (0.12) (0.13)
Ind:DistressT 0.23** 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.09 -0.00
(0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11)
Distress1T 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.69**
(0.10) (0.09) (0.28)
Distress2T -0.01 -0.05 0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Med. Ind. Q 0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.05 -0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09)
Med. Ind. Leverage 0.91*** 0.45 0.57* 0.17 -0.54 -0.19
(0.32) (0.38) (0.31) (0.41) (1.28) (1.56)
Target Size 0.89*** 0.83*** 0.90*** 0.84*** -0.11*** -0.15***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Target Leverage 0.80*** 1.11*** 0.27** 0.65*** -0.16 0.14
(0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.20) (0.21)
Target M/B 0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Target Tangibility -0.68*** -0.82*** -0.37*** -0.52*** -0.69** -0.88*
(0.15) (0.19) (0.11) (0.17) (0.32) (0.45)
Target Protability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Control: Acq. & Deal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1187 1300 1193 1306 1078 1167
Adj-R2 0.92 0.87 0.94 0.89 0.29 0.21
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Table 1.7: Eects of Fire-Sale on Synergy and Target Bargaining Power
This table presents the eect of re-sale on synergy and target's bargaining power. In Models (1)
and (2), the dependent variable is combined CAR, measured as the market equity value weighted
average of the target's CAR and acquirer's CAR. In Models (3) and (4), Ln(Synergy) is the log of
sum of the target's and acquirer's abnormal dollar returns (CAR MarketCap). In Models (5) and
(6), the dependent variable is target's bargaining power, NDCAR(!T ), estimated as the dierence
of abnormal dollar returns for the (-1, +1) window between target and acquirer divided by the
sum of market equity value of target and acquirer four weeks prior to acquisition announcement.
In Models (7) and (8), the dependent variable is BargainT , calculated as target's abnormal dollar
return divided by the combined abnormal dollar returns of acquirer and target. The variable of
interest is Fire-Sale | the interaction between target rm distress (Distress1T , Distress2T ) and
industry-level distress (Ind:DistressT ). Industry xed eects are at the 3-digit SIC code level.
Control variables are described in Table 1.5 and a detailed description of each variable is included
in Table 1.1. Robust standard errors clustered at year-industry are reported in parentheses.
Coecients marked ***, ** and * are signicant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dep. variable: CARCombined Ln(Synergy) NDCAR (!
T ) BargainT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fire-Sale1 0.03 -0.14 -0.10** -0.43***
(0.02) (0.63) (0.04) (0.08)
Fire-Sale2 -0.01 0.18 -0.05*** -0.20**
(0.02) (0.45) (0.02) (0.08)
Ind:DistressT 0.00 0.01 0.22 0.25 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.29) (0.27) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.06)
Distress1T -0.01 0.98*** 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.30) (0.01) (0.07)
Distress2T 0.01 0.34* -0.01 -0.05
(0.01) (0.17) (0.01) (0.04)
Med. Ind. Q 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.29 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.18) (0.18) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05)
Med. Ind. Lev. 0.08 0.08 -0.01 0.56 0.05 0.04 0.14 0.07
(0.07) (0.07) (1.44) (1.42) (0.06) (0.07) (0.38) (0.38)
Target Size 0.00** 0.01** 0.39*** 0.36*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Target Lev. -0.01 -0.02 0.55 0.37 -0.01 -0.00 -0.12 -0.05
(0.01) (0.02) (0.54) (0.56) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.11)
Target M/B -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.06 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Tangibility 0.02 0.02 0.54 0.70* -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.11
(0.02) (0.02) (0.36) (0.36) (0.01) (0.02) (0.09) (0.09)
Protability 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1098 1098 668 668 1098 1098 1011 1011
Adj-R2 0.10 0.10 0.63 0.62 0.18 0.18 0.06 0.06
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Table 1.8: Eects of Fire-Sale on Acquirer Identity
This table presents estimates from probit regressions that explain acquirer identity using target
rm- and industry-level distress and the interaction of these two variables. The dependent variable
is Outsider, a dummy that equals 1 if the acquirer's 3-digit SIC code is dierent from the target's.
Models (1) and (3) exclude control variables for acquirer and deal characteristics; Models (2) and
(4) include control variables, as described in Table 1.5. The variable of interest is Fire-Sale |
the interaction between target rm distress (Distress1T , Distress2T ) and industry-level distress
(Ind:DistressT ). Industry xed eects are at the 3-digit SIC code level. A detailed description
of each variable is included in Table 1.1. Robust standard errors clustered at year-industry are
reported in parentheses. Coecients marked ***, ** and * are signicant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
Dep. variable: Outsider (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fire-Sale1 -0.62 -0.23
(0.59) (0.69)
Fire-Sale2 -0.35 -0.25
(0.35) (0.40)
Ind:DistressT 0.55** 0.51** 0.51** 0.51**
(0.22) (0.23) (0.20) (0.22)
Distress1T -0.17 -0.18
(0.23) (0.28)
Distress2T -0.17 -0.11
(0.13) (0.15)
Med. Ind. Q -0.30** -0.33** -0.29** -0.32**
(0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15)
Med. Ind. Leverage -1.07 -2.09 -1.08 -2.12
(1.15) (1.38) (1.16) (1.39)
Target Size 0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Target Leverage -0.66** -0.68** -0.48 -0.58
(0.29) (0.32) (0.32) (0.36)
Target M/B 0.05*** 0.06** 0.05*** 0.06**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Target Tangibility -0.50 -0.54 -0.55* -0.59*
(0.33) (0.35) (0.33) (0.36)
Target Protability 0.01* 0.01 0.01* 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Control: Acq. & Deal No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1111 916 1111 916
Pseudo-R2 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.22
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Table 1.9: Eects of Fire-Sale with Outside Acquirers
This table tests whether re-sale eects are stronger when acquirers are industry outsiders. The
dependent variables for acquisition outcomes are as follows. Acquirer return: CARA, target oer
price: Ln(Price1), target bargaining power: NDCAR(!T ), and synergy: CARCombined. The
variable of interest is the interaction between Fire-Sale and Outsider. Fire-Sale is the interaction
between target rm distress (Distress1T , Distress2T ) and industry-level distress (Ind:DistressT ).
Outsider is a dummy variables that equals 1 if the acquirer's 3-digit SIC code is dierent from the
target's. Industry xed eects are at the 3-digit SIC code level. Control variables are described
in Table 1.5 and a detailed description of each variable is included in Table 1.1. Robust standard
errors clustered at year-industry are reported in parentheses. Coecients marked ***, ** and * are
signicant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dep. variable: CARA Ln(Price1) NDCAR (!
T ) CARCombined
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fire-Sale1*Outsider 0.20** -2.80** -0.25*** -0.14*
(0.08) (1.31) (0.09) (0.08)
Fire-Sale1 0.06 -0.36 -0.04 0.06***
(0.04) (0.34) (0.04) (0.02)
Ind:Dist:T *Outsider -0.02 0.11 0.03** 0.01
(0.02) (0.15) (0.01) (0.02)
Dist:1T *Outsider -0.01 0.14 0.02 -0.00
(0.03) (0.23) (0.02) (0.02)
Ind:DistressT 0.01 0.18* -0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01)
Distress1T -0.01 0.31** 0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.01)
Outsider 0.00 -0.11** -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
Med. Ind. Q 0.01* 0.00 -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01)
Med. Ind. Leverage 0.01 0.37 0.05 0.07
(0.05) (0.39) (0.06) (0.06)
Target Size -0.01*** 0.88*** 0.02*** 0.00**
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
Target Leverage -0.01 0.80*** -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01)
Target M/B -0.00*** 0.01 0.00 -0.01***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Target Tangibility 0.02 -0.67*** -0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.13) (0.02) (0.02)
Target Protability 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Control: Acq. & Deal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1098 1093 1098 1098
Adj-R2 0.08 0.92 0.18 0.11
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Table 1.10: Eects of Fire-Sale and Industry Capital-Specicity
This table tests whether re-sale eects are stronger when targets have high industry-level capital-
specicity. The dependent variables for acquisition outcomes are as follows. Acquirer return:
CARA, target oer price: Ln(Price1), target bargaining power: NDCAR(!T ), and synergy:
CARCombined. Industry capital-specicity is one minus the ratio of used capital expenditure
within an industry to the aggregate industry capital expenditure as calculated by Balasubramanian
and Sivadasan (2009). I dene an industry as a high capital-specicity industry if industry-level
capital-specicity is above the median value of the aggregate industry. The variable of interest is
the interaction between Fire-Sale and Capital-Specicity. Industry xed eects are at the 3-digit
SIC code level. Control variables are described in Table 1.5 and a detailed description of each
variable is included in Table 1.1. Robust standard errors clustered at year-industry are reported
in parentheses. Coecients marked ***, ** and * are signicant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Dep. variable: CARA Ln(Price1) NDCAR (!
T ) CARCombined
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fire-Sale1*Capital-Specicity 3.84* -81.49*** -5.74*** -6.03***
(2.27) (20.41) (2.00) (1.39)
Fire-Sale1 0.30*** -3.87*** -0.34*** -0.14***
(0.10) (0.75) (0.08) (0.04)
Ind:Dist:T *Capital-Specicity -0.15 1.99 0.30 0.19
(0.30) (2.24) (0.25) (0.31)
Dist:1T *Capital-Specicity 1.64** -9.93* -1.40* 1.20*
(0.70) (5.85) (0.72) (0.65)
Ind:DistressT 0.01 0.28* -0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.15) (0.02) (0.02)
Distress1T -0.04** 0.27 0.05** -0.02
(0.02) (0.19) (0.02) (0.02)
Med. Ind. Q 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.12) (0.02) (0.01)
Med. Ind. Leverage -0.02 0.30 0.13 0.11
(0.09) (0.70) (0.12) (0.13)
Target Size -0.01** 0.88*** 0.02*** 0.01**
(0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)
Target Leverage 0.01 0.54*** -0.04* -0.02
(0.02) (0.18) (0.02) (0.03)
Target M/B -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01**
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Target Tangibility 0.00 -0.74*** 0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.20) (0.02) (0.03)
Target Protability 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Control: Acq. & Deal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 570 567 570 570
Adj-R2 0.08 0.91 0.24 0.12
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Table 1.11: Eects of Fire-Sale and Labor Union
This table examines whether re-sale eects are stronger when target industries have strong labor
unions. Industry labor unionization is measured by the percentage of unionized workers in each
industry. I dene an industry to be a strong labor union industry if the union membership at
3-digit SIC industry-level is above the overall median. Panel A includes only acquisitions in strong
labor union industries and Panel B includes only acquisitions in weak labor union industries. The
dependent variables for acquisition outcomes are as follows. Acquirer return: CARA, target oer
price: Ln(Price1), target bargaining power: NDCAR(!T ), and synergy: CARCombined. Industry
xed eects are at the 3-digit SIC code level. Control variables are described in Table 1.5 and a
detailed description of each variable is included in Table 1.1. Robust standard errors clustered at
year-industry are reported in parentheses. Coecients marked ***, ** and * are signicant at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A. Strong Labor Union Industries
Dep. variable: CARA Ln(Price1) NDCAR (!
T ) CARCombined
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fire-Sale1 0.20*** -4.26** -0.19*** 0.01
(0.05) (1.67) (0.04) (0.05)
Ind:DistressT -0.00 0.36* -0.03 -0.03
(0.01) (0.19) (0.02) (0.03)
Distress1T -0.05* 0.66*** 0.06** -0.03
(0.03) (0.19) (0.03) (0.03)
Target & Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acq. & Deal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 491 490 491 491
Adj-R2 0.03 0.91 0.21 0.17
Panel B. Weak Labor Union Industries
Dep. variable: CARA Ln(Price1) NDCAR (!
T ) CARCombined
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fire-Sale1 0.08* -0.29 -0.07 0.08**
(0.04) (0.32) (0.05) (0.03)
Ind:DistressT 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01)
Distress1T 0.00 0.38*** -0.01 -0.00
(0.02) (0.14) (0.02) (0.01)
Target & Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acq. & Deal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 572 568 572 572
Adj-R2 0.14 0.92 0.19 0.07
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Table 1.12: Eects of Fire-Sale and R&D Intensity
This table examines whether re-sale eects are stronger when target industries have high R&D
intensity. R&D intensity is measured by research and development expenses scaled by sales. I dene
an industry to be a high (low) R&D industry if the R&D intensity at 3-digit SIC industry-level is
above (below) the overall median. Panel A includes only acquisitions in intense R&D industries
and Panel B includes only acquisitions in low R&D industries. The dependent variables for
acquisition outcomes are as follows. Acquirer return: CARA, target oer price: Ln(Price1), target
bargaining power: NDCAR(!T ), and synergy: CARCombined. Industry xed eects are at the
3-digit SIC code level. Control variables are described in Table 1.5 and a detailed description
of each variable is included in Table 1.1. Robust standard errors clustered at year-industry are
reported in parentheses. Coecients marked ***, ** and * are signicant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
Panel A. High R&D Industries
Dep. variable: CARA Ln(Price1) NDCAR (!
T ) CARCombined
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fire-Sale1 0.16*** -1.08** -0.13*** 0.08
(0.05) (0.43) (0.05) (0.05)
Ind:DistressT -0.01 0.07 0.02 0.02
(0.04) (0.29) (0.03) (0.04)
Distress1T 0.01 0.26* -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.15) (0.02) (0.02)
Target & Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acq. & Deal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 538 533 538 538
Adj-R2 0.09 0.91 0.21 -0.05
Panel B. Low R&D Industries
Dep. variable: CARA Ln(Price1) NDCAR (!
T ) CARCombined
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fire-Sale1 -0.04 1.53 0.13 0.11
(0.17) (1.05) (0.21) (0.20)
Ind:DistressT -0.10 0.08 0.12 -0.05
(0.07) (0.45) (0.09) (0.09)
Distress1T -0.02 0.97*** 0.01 -0.01
(0.04) (0.27) (0.05) (0.05)
Target & Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acq. & Deal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 522 522 522 522
Adj-R2 0.25 0.96 0.09 0.26
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Table 1.13: Descriptive Statistics for Alternative Explanations
The table contains the descriptive statistics for key variables in robustness tests. Panel A provides
the summary for target misvaluation by decomposing market-to-book ratio (M/B) into target
rm-specic error, industry-wide short-run error, and long-run growth option based on Appendix
A. Panel B provides the summary for macroeconomic variables including Recession, annual GDP
growth rate(%) and spread between Aaa corporate bond and Bbb bond (%).A target is classied
as distressed, based on a dummy variable Distress2T , if the rm's leverage ratio is greater than
the median leverage ratio of all rms in the same industry, and the rm's current ratio (current
assets/current liabilities) is less than the median current ratio of the industry. Industry is dened
as distressed, based on a dummy variable Ind:DistressT . Ind:DistressT is a dummy that equals
1 if the sales growth of the median rm in an industry is negative in the year of the transaction.
The industry of a rm is dened as the set of rms with the same 3-digit SIC code. All variables
are further dened in Appendix 1.1.
All Distressed Target Non-distressed Target
Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev.
Panel A. Target Misvaluation
Ln(M/B): mit   bit 0.52 0.60 0.42 0.51 0.55 0.63
Target error: mit   v(it;jt) 0.05 0.55 -0.02 0.49 0.07 0.58
Sector error: v(it;jt)  v(it;j) -0.06 0.21 -0.08 0.23 -0.05 0.20
Growth Option: v(it;j)  bit 0.55 0.40 0.54 0.43 0.55 0.38
Panel B. Recession
Recession 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.33 0.11 0.31
Annual GDP growth (%) 5.50 2.09 5.42 1.98 5.53 2.13
Spread (Aaa-Bbb) (%) 0.96 0.41 0.95 0.44 0.97 0.40
Number of Observations 1627 421 1206
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Table 1.14: Eects of Fire-Sale and Stock Market Misvaluation
This table presents coecient estimates from OLS regressions on outcome variables after controlling
for the misvaluation of target. Target Ind. Misvaluation is target industry-wide short-run error
and Target Misvaluation is target-specic error. The dependent variables for acquisition outcomes
are as follows. Acquirer return: CARA, target oer price: Ln(Price1), target bargaining power:
NDCAR(!T ), and synergy: CARCombined. The variable of interest is the interaction between
Fire-Sale and Outsider. Fire-Sale is the interaction between target rm distress, Distress1T ,
and industry-level distress Ind:DistressT . Industry xed eects are at the 3-digit SIC code level.
Control variables are described in Table 1.5 and a detailed description of each variable is included
in Table 1.1. Robust standard errors clustered at year-industry are reported in parentheses.
Coecients marked ***, ** and * are signicant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dep. variable: CARA Ln(Price1) NDCAR (!
T ) CARCombined
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fire-Sale1 0.10*** -1.03* -0.10** 0.02
(0.03) (0.60) (0.04) (0.02)
Ind:DistressT 0.01 0.20* -0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01)
Distress1T -0.02 0.42*** 0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01)
Target Misvaluation -0.02** 0.18*** 0.01 -0.02**
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
Target Ind. Misvaluation -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.00
(0.02) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02)
Med. Ind. Q 0.01** -0.02 -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
Med. Ind. Leverage 0.01 0.41 0.05 0.08
(0.05) (0.42) (0.06) (0.07)
Target Size -0.01*** 0.86*** 0.02*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
Target Leverage -0.00 0.75*** -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01)
Target M/B -0.00 -0.02* -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Target Tangibility 0.03 -0.69*** -0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.15) (0.01) (0.02)
Target Protability 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Control: Acq. & Deal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1098 1093 1098 1098
Adj-R2 0.08 0.92 0.18 0.11
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Table 1.15: Eects of Fire-Sale and Recession
This table presents coecient estimates from OLS regressions on outcome variables after controlling
for the recession. Recessions is dened as recessionary months identied by NBER. The dependent
variables for acquisition outcomes are as follows. Acquirer return: CARA, target oer price:
Ln(Price1), target bargaining power: NDCAR(!T ), and synergy: CARCombined. The variable
of interest is the interaction between Fire-Sale and Outsider. Fire-Sale is the interaction
between target rm distress, Distress1T , and industry-level distress Ind:DistressT . Industry
xed eects are at the 3-digit SIC code level. Control variables are described in Table 1.5 and a
detailed description of each variable is included in Table 1.1. Robust standard errors clustered at
year-industry are reported in parentheses. Coecients marked ***, ** and * are signicant at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dep. variable: CARA Ln(Price1) NDCAR (!
T ) CARCombined
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fire-Sale1 0.11*** -1.11* -0.10** 0.03
(0.03) (0.63) (0.04) (0.02)
Ind:DistressT 0.00 0.22* 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01)
Distress1T -0.01 0.37*** 0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01)
Recession -0.02* -0.03 0.02*** -0.01
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
Med. Ind. Q 0.01** -0.00 -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01)
Med. Ind. Leverage 0.01 0.38 0.05 0.08
(0.05) (0.43) (0.06) (0.07)
Target Size -0.01*** 0.88*** 0.02*** 0.00**
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
Target Leverage -0.01 0.79*** -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01)
Target M/B -0.00*** 0.01 0.00 -0.01***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Target Tangibility 0.03 -0.69*** -0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.16) (0.01) (0.02)
Target Protability 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Control: Acq. & Deal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1098 1093 1098 1098
Adj-R2 0.08 0.91 0.18 0.10
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Table 1.16: Descriptive Statistics for Target Industry Rivals
The table contains descriptive statistics for matched target industry rivals. The target rivals are
matched based on same industry, size and M/B. Target is classied as distressed, based on a
dummy variable Distress2T , if the rm's leverage ratio is greater than the median leverage ratio of
all rms in the same industry, and the rm's current ratio (current assets/current liabilities) is less
than the median current ratio of the industry. Industry is dened as distressed, based on a dummy
variable Ind:DistressT . Ind:DistressT is a dummy that equals 1 if the sales growth of the median
rm in an industry is negative in the year of the transaction. The industry of a rm is dened as
the set of rms with the same 3-digit SIC code. Panel A provides the summary for target industry
rivals' abnormal returns at announcement. Rival CARs(%) are rivals' cumulative abnormal returns
for the (-1, +1) window surrounding the announcement of acquisitions. Panel B provides the
median ROA (net income/total assets), before (t-3, t-1) and after (t+1, t+3) acquisition. Panel C
provides the median protability margin (operating cash ow/total sales) for target industry rivals
at announcement.
All Distressed Target Non-distressed Target
- Dist. Ind. Non-dist. Ind. Dist. Ind. Non-dist. Ind.
Panel A. Rival CAR (%)
Mean 0.280 -0.895 0.559 0.278 0.233
Std. Dev. 5.632 5.944 6.080 4.983 5.505
Number of Obs. 1154 19 287 72 750
Panel B. Rival ROA (Median)
Before (-3,-1) 0.032 -0.002 0.039 0.018 0.030
After (+1,+3) 0.025 0.024 0.031 0.016 0.024
Change -0.007 0.026 -0.008 -0.002 -0.006
Number of Obs. 1249 19 319 74 837
Panel C. Rival Protability Margin (Median)
Before (-3,-1) 0.101 0.190 0.104 0.108 0.094
After (+1,+3) 0.105 0.175 0.113 0.113 0.099
Change 0.004 -0.016 0.008 0.005 0.005
Number of Obs. 1160 19 281 65 795
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Table 1.17: Eects of Fire-Sale on Target Industry Rival CARs(%)
This table presents the impact of re-sale on abnormal returns for target industry rivals. The
dependent variables are matched rivals' abnormal stock returns (%) at the announcement of
acquisition. Models (1) and (2) are for all matched rivals, Models (3)-(4) for the matched sample in
high R&D industries, and Models (5)-(6) for the matched sample in low R&D industries. I dene an
industry to be a high (low) R&D industry if the R&D intensity at 3-digit SIC industry-level is above
(below) the overall median. R&D intensity is measured by research and development expenses
scaled by total sales. The target rivals are matched based on same industry, size, and M/B. CARs
(%) are cumulative abnormal returns for the (-1, +1) window surrounding the announcement of
acquisitions. The variable of interest is Fire-Sale | the interaction between target rm distress
(Distress1T , Distress2T ) and industry-level distress (Ind:DistressT ). Industry xed eects are at
the 3-digit SIC code level. Control variables are described in Table 1.5 and a detailed description
of each variable is included in Table 1.1. Additional control variables for rival characteristics are
industry concentration(HHI), size, leverage, m=b, tangibility, and profitability. Robust standard
errors clustered at year-industry are reported in parentheses. Coecients marked ***, ** and * are
signicant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dep. variable: All Matched Rivals High R&D Industry Low R&D Industry
Rival CAR(%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fire-Sale1 -4.59* -6.15** -3.88
(2.45) (2.75) (3.56)
Fire-Sale2 -3.96** -5.97*** -4.19
(1.97) (2.18) (2.67)
Ind:DistressT 0.44 0.35 0.22 -0.17 2.60 3.14
(1.19) (1.30) (1.66) (1.61) (1.81) (2.57)
Distress1T -0.06 -1.15 1.12
(1.83) (2.52) (2.58)
Distress2T 0.30 -1.26 1.88
(0.68) (1.02) (1.14)
Med. Ind. Q 0.93 0.89 1.65 1.45 -0.41 0.39
(0.87) (0.83) (1.09) (1.04) (1.78) (1.60)
Med. Ind. Leverage 5.06 5.74 9.19 6.76 -5.70 0.53
(7.19) (7.16) (12.24) (12.17) (10.34) (10.73)
HHI -4.19 -3.43 -8.82 -8.26 -5.56 -3.07
(4.28) (4.25) (5.69) (5.93) (8.80) (8.05)
Rival Size 0.26 0.18 0.94 0.74 -0.54 -0.52
(0.59) (0.50) (0.79) (0.70) (1.06) (0.79)
Rival Leverage 0.49* 0.45* 0.48 0.28 0.74 1.07*
(0.27) (0.26) (0.34) (0.35) (0.65) (0.61)
Rival M/B 2.76 2.45 1.88 1.06 2.69 2.81
(1.80) (1.70) (2.86) (2.94) (2.39) (2.07)
Rival Tangibility -1.91 -2.25 0.32 0.53 -8.28** -8.77**
(2.00) (2.14) (2.43) (2.77) (3.70) (3.61)
Rival Protability 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
Control: Target & Deal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control: Acq. No No No No No No
Year Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 714 753 367 382 347 371
R2 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.40 0.40
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Table 1.18: Eects of Fire-Sale on Target Industry Rivals' Operating Performance
This table presents the impact of re-sale on matched target rivals' operating performance. In
Models (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the dierence of average ROA (net income/total book
assets), before (t-3, t-1) and after (t+1, t+3) acquisition. In Models (3) and (4), the dependent
variable is the dierence of average protability margin (operating cash ow/total sales), before
(t-3, t-1) and after (t+1, t+3) acquisition. The variable of interest is Fire-Sale | the interaction
between target rm distress (Distress1T , Distress2T ) and industry-level distress (Ind:DistressT ).
Industry xed eects are at the 3-digit SIC code level. Control variables are described in Table 1.5
and a detailed description of each variable is included in Table 1.1. Additional control variables
for rival characteristics are industry concentration(HHI), size, leverage, m=b, tangibility, and
profitability. Robust standard errors clustered at year-industry are reported in parentheses.
Coecients marked ***, ** and * are signicant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dep. variable: Prot Di ROA Di
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fire-Sale1 1.05 -0.44
(15.98) (0.60)
Fire-Sale2 -3.42 -0.29
(10.00) (0.39)
Ind:DistressT -4.11 0.34 0.15 0.38
(6.60) (6.28) (0.31) (0.38)
Distress1T 11.35 0.10
(16.70) (0.27)
Distress2T 6.20 0.26
(6.70) (0.23)
Med. Ind. Q 10.45 5.71 0.03 0.12
(8.98) (7.66) (0.24) (0.29)
Med. Ind. Leverage 54.08 38.10 2.88 3.22
(58.16) (50.08) (3.01) (3.26)
HHI -23.12 -31.65 -0.05 0.03
(31.08) (30.19) (0.56) (0.75)
Rival Size -1.59 -1.90 -0.03 -0.03
(2.96) (3.13) (0.06) (0.11)
Rival Leverage -17.51 -15.06 0.10 0.08
(11.89) (11.16) (0.08) (0.12)
Rival M/B -24.71 -20.88 0.01 0.41
(19.02) (17.05) (0.28) (0.46)
Rival Tangibility 13.00 13.38 -0.14 0.02
(16.55) (15.69) (0.26) (0.40)
Rival Protability 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Control: Target Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control: Acq. & Deal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 286 305 294 314
Adj-R2 0.65 0.68 0.30 0.37
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Distance-to-Default Model
The KMV-Merton model estimates a default probability based on the bond pric-
ing model by Merton (1974). It calculates the probability that the value of the rm
will be less than the face value of debt at given point in time. The model requires
market equity value (E) and face value of debt (F) from COMPUSTAT and risk-free
rate of return(r). Following Vassalou and Xing (2004), the face value of debt (F)
is calculated by (Current liability + 0.5 * Long-term debt).1 I follow Bharath and
Shumway (2008) to construct this measure as given below.
Step 1: Estimate the equity volatility (E) from historical stock returns over the
past one year (set T=1).
Step 2: Simultaneously solve the below two equations numerically for values of V
and V .
E = V N(d1)  e rTFN(d2)
E = (
V
E
)N(d1)V
Step 3: Calculate the distance to default using
DD =
ln(V=F ) + (r + 0:52V )T
V
p
T
The corresponding probability of default (EDF) is N( DD).
1Vassalou and Xing (2004) highlights that long-term liabilities should be taken into account
for corporate default risk because long-term debt inuences the solvency of rm through interest
payments and the roll-over decision of short-term debt.
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Computation of Target Undervaluation
Follow Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), I construct the measure for target undervaluation
by decomposing the market-to-book ratio into three components: the rm-specic
error; industry-wide short-run error and long-run growth option based on the below
equation.
mit   bit = mit   v(it;jt)| {z }
rm
+ v(it;jt)  v(it;j)| {z }
sector
+ v(it;j)  bit| {z }
long-run
Where mit   bit is the natural log of the market to book ratio. v(it;jt) is the
estimated fundamental value of the rm at year t by applying rm-specic model
parameter jt and v(it;j) is the long-run average fundamental value of the rm
estimated based on industry average parameter j. The rst step is to estimate
the market value of rm i at time t, mit based on the below regression (Model 3 in
Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005)).
mit = 0jt + 1jtbit + 2jtni
+
it + 3jtI(<0)(ni
+)it + 4jtLevit + "i
Where bit is the logs of book asset value, ni
+
it is natural log of the absolute value of
net income and I(<0) is an indicator function for negative net income. This estima-
tion provides the set of rm-specic loading jt for each accounting variable. Then,
I calculate j by aggregating jt over the sample period. Lastly, using the tted
parameters, I calculate v(it;jt) and v(it;j).
v(it;jt) = 0jt + 1jtbit + 2jtni
+
it + 3jtI(<0)(ni
+)it + 4jtLevit
v(it;j) = 0j + 1jbit + 2jni
+
it + 3jI(<0)(ni
+)it + 4jLevit
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APPENDIX B
Recourse Mortgage Law and the Housing Bubble
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Figure 2.1: State-level Variation in Mortgage Recourse law
This gure illustrates the classication of mortgage recourse law. States shaded
in dark are non-recourse states. These states with non-recourse law are Alaska,
Arizona, California, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin.
Figure 2.2: State-level Variation in Judicial Foreclosure Requirement
This gure illustrates the classication of judicial requirement. States shaded in
dark mandate a judicial process when lenders foreclose on property. Among eleven
non-recourse states, three states (Iowa, North Dakota and Wisconsin) have the
judicial foreclosure requirement.
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Figure 2.3: Recourse Law and Housing Price Growth Rate
This gure plots the aggregate housing price growth rates in recourse and non-
recourse states. Panel A shows the housing price growth rate per square foot over
recourse law from zipcode-level data from 1998-2012. Panel B shows the median
price-to-rent growth rate from 2006-2011. Housing Price Growth (Sq. Ft) is the
percentage annual growth rate of the median of sale prices scaled by the square
footage of a home. Price-to-Rent growth rate is the county-level median rent value
divided by county-level median housing price from the American Community Survey
Census data.
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Figure 2.4: Recourse Law and Household Investment Behavior
This gure plots the households' investment behaviors in housing market in recourse
and non-recourse states. Panel A plots households' average ratio of home equity to
total wealth. Panel B plots the average debt-to-income ratio at origination, dened
as the borrower's total monthly obligations divided by their monthly income.
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Figure 2.5: Recourse Law and Mortgage Lending Behavior: LTV Ratio
This gure plots the mortgage lending behaviors in recourse and non-recourse
states. Panel A plots the average loan-to-value ratio, dened as the loan amount
secured by a mortgaged property on the origination date. Panel B plots the average
loan-to-value ratio for a group of borrowers whose occupancy status is either second
home or investment property.
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Figure 2.6: Recourse Law and Mortgage Lending Behavior: Interest Rates and Denial
This gure plots the mortgage lending behaviors in recourse and non-recourse states.
Panel A plots the average interest rate on the origination date. Panel B plots the
average rate of mortgage application denial due to a high risk of insolvency.
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Figure 2.7: Recourse Law and Sub-Prime Ratio
This gure illustrates the time-series trend of the average sub-prime ratio in
recourse and non-recourse states. We classify sub-prime loans based on lender
identication. Using a list of sub-prime lender specialists compiled annually by HUD
(http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/manu.html), we construct a sub-prime
ratio measure; specically, the number of sub-prime mortgage loans out of the total
number of mortgage loans originated.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis
for the period 1998-2012. Housing Price Growth (Sq. Ft) is the percentage annual
growth rate of the median of sale prices scaled by the square footage of a home.
Housing Price Growth represents the percentage annual growth of the median of
sale prices without scaling. Both measures for housing price are aggregated at the
ZIP code-level. Price-to-Rent Growth rate is the percentage annual growth rate of
the county-level median rent value divided by the county-level median housing price
from the American Community Survey data from 2006-2011. House Share is the
average ratio of home equity to total wealth of households aggregated at the state
level. Debt-to-Income is the borrower's total monthly obligations divided by their
monthly income at origination at the ZIP code-level. LTV is the loan-to-value ratio,
dened as the loan amount secured by a mortgaged property on the origination date
divided by the purchase price. LTV (investment home) is the average loan-to-value
ratio for a property that is for a second home or investment at purchase. Interest
is the annual percentage rate (APR) on mortgage loans. Denial rate is the rate of
mortgage application denial due to a high risk of insolvency. Sub-prime loan ratio is
the aggregate ratio of the number of sub-prime mortgage loans to the total number
of mortgage loans originated at the ZIP code-level. Housing supply elasticity is the
MSA-level variable provided by Saiz (2010). The other variables are all state-level
statistics. GDP Growth rate is the annual percentage growth rate of nominal
GDP. Income Growth Per Capita is the growth rate of (total income/population).
Unemployment rate is the annual unemployment rate.
Mean Std. Dev. 10th 50th 90th N
Housing Price Growth (Sq. Ft) 0.06 0.41 -0.11 0.05 0.25 29,779
Housing Price Growth 0.07 0.43 -0.11 0.06 0.26 30,800
Price-to-Rent Growth, 2006-2011 -0.03 0.07 -0.11 -0.03 0.07 17,930
House Share, 2001-2009 0.56 0.08 0.45 0.56 0.63 255
Debt-to-Income 0.36 0.03 0.32 0.36 0.39 282,304
LTV 0.79 0.04 0.74 0.80 0.84 282,327
LTV (investment home) 0.79 0.05 0.74 0.79 0.84 280,440
Interest (%) 5.88 0.54 5.02 5.94 6.48 282,327
Interest (investment home, %) 6.11 0.55 5.2 6.18 6.72 280,440
Denial rate 0.17 0.09 0.00 0.19 0.25 253,609
Sub-prime loan ratio 0.14 0.16 0.00 0.10 0.36 251,430
GDP Growth 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 441
Income Growth Per Capita 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 441
Unemployment 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.07 441
Population Growth 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 441
Housing Supply Elasticity 1.94 1.12 0.81 1.67 3.25 83
Property Tax (%) 1.44 0.49 0.74 1.42 2.11 51
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Table 2.2: Univariate Analysis
This table presents the comparisons of the main variables between Recourse state and
non-Recourse state. Panel A presents the statistics for the sample period 2003-2006
(Expansion). Panel B presents the statistics for the sample period 2007-2011
(Recession). States are classied as recourse states if lenders are permitted to claim
deciency judgments in the event of mortgage default. We report the dierences
in average value in recourse states and in non-recourse states. ***, ** and * are
signicant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Recourse Non-recourse Di.
Panel A. Expansion (2003-2006) Mean SD p50 Mean SD p50 -
Housing Price Growth (Sq. Ft) 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.04***
Housing Price Growth 0.10 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.04***
Price-to-Rent Growth (2006) 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.03***
House Share 0.58 0.07 0.58 0.59 0.07 0.60 0.01***
Debt-to-Income 0.36 0.02 0.36 0.37 0.02 0.38 0.01***
LTV 0.79 0.04 0.79 0.74 0.07 0.76 -0.04***
LTV (investment home) 0.80 0.04 0.80 0.74 0.07 0.76 -0.06***
Interest (%) 6.10 0.28 5.96 6.03 0.27 5.90 -0.07***
Interest (investment home, %) 6.36 0.30 6.31 6.23 0.27 6.12 -0.13***
Denial rate 0.18 0.05 0.18 0.18 0.05 0.18 0.00***
Sub-prime loan ratio 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.01***
GDP Growth 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.01***
Income Growth Per Capita 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.01***
Unemployment 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.00***
Population Growth 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00***
Panel B. Recession (2007-2011)
Housing Price Growth (Sq. Ft) -0.03 0.87 -0.05 -0.06 0.21 -0.06 -0.03*
Housing Price Growth -0.01 0.92 -0.04 -0.04 0.17 -0.05 -0.03*
Price-to-Rent Growth -0.05 0.06 -0.05 -0.07 0.09 -0.08 -0.02***
House Share 0.56 0.07 0.57 0.54 0.03 0.55 -0.02***
Debt-to-Income 0.34 0.03 0.34 0.35 0.03 0.35 0.01***
LTV 0.78 0.03 0.78 0.77 0.03 0.77 -0.01***
LTV (investment home) 0.76 0.03 0.76 0.75 0.03 0.75 -0.01***
Interest (%) 5.23 0.61 4.98 5.22 0.58 5.01 -0.01*
Interest (investment home, %) 5.52 0.65 5.27 5.46 0.62 5.23 -0.06***
Denial rate 0.18 0.05 0.18 0.18 0.05 0.18 0.00
Sub-prime loan ratio 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 -0.04***
GDP Growth 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00
Income Growth Per Capita 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00***
Unemployment 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.01***
Population Growth 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00***
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Table 2.3: Recourse Law and Housing Price Growth
This table reports estimates and standard errors for regressions of housing price
growth on non-recourse law indicators for the period 2003-2011 for the full sample
and contiguous border county-pair sample. The dependent variable is Housing Price
Growth (Sq. Ft), the percentage annual growth rate of the median of sale prices
scaled by the square footage of a home. This measure is aggregated at the ZIP code
level. Crisis is a dummy variable that equals zero before and including 2006, and one
after that year. A state is classied as a Non-recourse state (Non-recourse=1) if the
state does not allow lenders to claim deciency judgments in the event of mortgage
default. Distance is the shortest distance between the closest border and the centroid
of a ZIP code. DistanceR represents the interaction of distance and an indicator
(I(recourse)). DistanceNR represents the interaction of distance and an indicator
(I(non-recourse)). The other control variables are dened in Table 1.2. All standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the county level. Coef-
cients marked ***, ** and * are signicant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Non-recourse 0.03*** 0.02** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.45***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Crisis -0.13*** -0.03*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.11***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Crisis*Non-recourse -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.03** -0.03** -0.05***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP Growth 1.85*** 1.87*** 1.86*** 2.09***
(0.31) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13)
Income Growth -0.01 0.07 0.07 -0.94***
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
Unemployment -0.62** -0.03 -0.02 1.30***
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.18)
Pop. Growth -0.53 4.08*** 4.15*** 6.72***
(0.55) (0.65) (0.65) (0.59)
Supply Elasticity -0.02*** 0.03 0.02 0.08
(0.00) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Judicial Foreclosure 0.03*** 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Property Tax -0.04*** -0.03 -0.02 -0.04
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
DistanceR -0.00* -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
DistanceNR -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
(DistanceR)2 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
(DistanceNR)2 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.09*** 0.09*** -0.11 -0.11 -0.27***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
County-Pair Sample No No Yes Yes Yes
County-Pair FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Controls No No No No Yes
N 29777 17558 4154 4149 4432
R2 0.03 0.29 0.38 0.39 0.39
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Table 2.4: Recourse Law and Price-to-Rent Growth
This table reports estimates and standard errors for regressions of the price-to-rent
growth rate on non-recourse law indicators in the pre-crisis period 2005-2006 for the
full sample and contiguous border county-pair sample. The dependent variable is
Price-to-Rent growth rate is the percentage annual growth rate of the county-level
median rent value divided by the county-level median housing price from the
American Community Survey data. A state is classied as a Non-recourse state
(Non-recourse=1) if the state does not allow lenders to claim deciency judgments
in the event of mortgage default. Distance is the shortest distance between the
closest border and the centroid of a ZIP code. DistanceR represents the interaction
of distance and an indicator (I(recourse)). DistanceNR represents the interaction of
distance and an indicator (I(non-recourse)). The other control variables are dened
in Table 1.2. All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at
the county level. Coecients marked ***, ** and * are signicant at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Non-recourse 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
GDP Growth 0.04 0.29*** 0.29*** 1.92***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Income Growth 1.92*** 3.16*** 3.15*** -1.42***
(0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Unemployment 0.81*** 2.71*** 2.71*** 3.69***
(0.17) (0.54) (0.54) (0.53)
Pop. Growth 1.55*** 5.24*** 5.31*** 1.61*
(0.21) (0.66) (0.67) (0.85)
Supply Elasticity 0.00 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.02**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Judicial Foreclosure 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Property Tax 0.00 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
DistanceR -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
DistanceNR -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
(DistanceR)2 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
(DistanceNR)2 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.02*** -0.15*** -0.41*** -0.40*** -0.20***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
County-Pair Sample No No Yes Yes Yes
County-Pair FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Controls No No No No Yes
N 5950 2866 2854 2846 2846
R2 0.02 0.16 0.60 0.60 0.56
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Table 2.5: Recourse Law and Household Investment Behaviors
This table reports estimates and standard errors for regressions of household
investment behaviors for the pre-crisis period 2003-2006. In Columns (1)-(3), the
dependent variable is the average ratio of home equity to total wealth at the state
level. In Columns (4)-(6), the dependent variable is the average debt-to-income ratio
at the ZIP code level. A state is classied as a Non-recourse state (Non-recourse=1) if
the state does not allow lender to claim deciency judgments in the event of mortgage
default. Distance is the shortest distance between the closest border and the centroid
of a ZIP code. DistanceR represents the interaction of distance and an indicator
(I(recourse)). DistanceNR represents the interaction of distance and an indicator
(I(non-recourse)). The other control variables are dened in Table 1.2. All standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the county level. Coef-
cients marked ***, ** and * are signicant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Dep. Variable: Asset Allocation Debt-to-Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non-recourse 0.02** 0.07** 0.07** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
GDP Growth 0.35** 1.35** 1.35** -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.21***
(0.17) (0.64) (0.64) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Income Growth 0.66 -1.83* -1.83* 0.37*** 0.24*** 0.24***
(0.47) (0.99) (0.99) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Unemployment -0.06 -4.51*** -4.53*** -0.69*** -1.91*** -1.91***
(0.54) (1.60) (1.61) (0.06) (0.16) (0.16)
Pop. Growth -1.32** -6.17** -6.20** -0.05 -0.92*** -0.94***
(0.56) (2.71) (2.71) (0.12) (0.31) (0.32)
Supply Elasticity -0.02*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Judicial Foreclosure 0.03*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00* 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Property Tax -0.05*** 0.05* 0.06** 0.00* -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
DistanceR -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
DistanceNR -0.00** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
(DistanceR)2 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
(DistanceNR)2 0.00** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.64*** 0.90*** 0.91*** 0.41*** 0.51*** 0.50***
(0.04) (0.12) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
County-Pair Sample No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
County-Pair FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 17769 4395 4383 29615 7325 7305
R2 0.28 0.53 0.53 0.44 0.75 0.76
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Table 2.6: Recourse Law and Mortgage Lending Behavior: Loan-to-Value
This table reports estimates and standard errors for regressions of mortgage lending
behavior in the pre-crisis period. In Columns (1)-(3), the dependent variable is the
loan-to-value ratio, dened as the loan amount secured by a mortgaged property on
the origination date divided by the purchase price. In Columns (4)-(6), the dependent
variable is LTV (investment purpose) which equals the average loan-to-value ratio
for a group of borrowers whose occupancy status is either second home or investment
property at purchase. A state is classied as a Non-recourse state (Non-recourse=1) if
the state does not allow lender to claim deciency judgments in the event of mortgage
default. Distance is the shortest distance between the closest border and the centroid
of a ZIP code. DistanceR represents the interaction of distance and an indicator
(I(recourse)). DistanceNR represents the interaction of distance and an indicator
(I(non-recourse)). The other control variables are dened in Table 1.2. All standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the county level. Coef-
cients marked ***, ** and * are signicant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Dep. Variable: LTV LTV Invest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non-recourse -0.03*** -0.03* -0.04** -0.05*** -0.05** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
GDP Growth -0.22** -0.24** -0.23** -0.18* 0.03 0.03
(0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07)
Income Growth -0.50*** -0.07 -0.07 -0.55*** -0.05 -0.05
(0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09)
Unemployment 0.47** 1.80*** 1.80*** -0.02 1.54*** 1.54***
(0.23) (0.35) (0.35) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Pop. Growth 0.94*** 1.56** 1.57** 0.66* 1.02** 1.04**
(0.34) (0.61) (0.60) (0.37) (0.40) (0.41)
Supply Elasticity 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02** 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Judicial Foreclosure 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02** 0.02* 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Property Tax 0.01* -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.01** -0.03*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
DistanceR -0.00** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
DistanceNR 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
(DistanceR)2 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
(DistanceNR)2 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.73*** 0.66*** 0.67*** 0.76*** 0.72*** 0.72***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
County-Pair Sample No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
County-Pair FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 29615 7325 7305 29611 7325 7305
R2 0.46 0.68 0.68 0.51 0.70 0.71
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Table 2.7: Recourse Law and Mortgage Lending Behavior: Interest Rates and Denial
This table reports estimates and standard errors for regressions of mortgage lending
behavior in the pre-crisis period. In Columns (1)-(3), the dependent variable is
mortgage interest, the annual percentage rate (APR) on mortgage loans. This
measure is aggregated at the ZIP code level from loan purchase data by two
major Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporations: Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae. In Columns (4)-(6), the dependent variable is the denial rate of mortgage
loan applications aggregated at the ZIP code level. A state is classied as the
Non-recourse state (Non-recourse=1) if the state does not allow lender to claim
deciency judgments in the event of mortgage default. Distance is the shortest
distance between the closest border and the centroid of a ZIP code. DistanceR
represents the interaction of distance and an indicator (I(recourse)). DistanceNR
represents the interaction of distance and an indicator (I(non-recourse)). The other
control variables are all state-level statistics and dened in Table 1.2. All standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the county level. Coef-
cients marked ***, ** and * are signicant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Dep. Variable: Interest (%) Denial rate
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Non-recourse 0.04 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.01 0.08*** 0.07***
(0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
GDP Growth -7.74*** -9.43*** -9.40*** -0.34*** -0.36*** -0.35***
(0.87) (1.75) (1.75) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08)
Income Growth 8.76*** 9.21*** 9.20*** 0.70*** 0.15 0.14
(0.89) (1.68) (1.69) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Unemployment -9.70*** -22.92*** -22.98*** -0.09 -3.28*** -3.29***
(1.49) (3.77) (3.78) (0.25) (0.30) (0.30)
Pop. Growth 6.88*** 12.53* 12.51* 0.35 -1.53*** -1.45**
(1.20) (7.10) (7.09) (0.24) (0.58) (0.57)
Supply Elasticity -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 -0.03**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Judicial Foreclosure 0.03 0.16** 0.17*** -0.01 0.01 0.01*
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Property Tax 0.06* 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.02***
(0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
DistanceR -0.00** -0.00**
(0.00) (0.00)
DistanceNR -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
(DistanceR)2 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
(DistanceNR)2 0.00* -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 6.44*** 7.00*** 7.03*** 0.15*** 0.31*** 0.37***
(0.08) (0.33) (0.32) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
County-Pair Sample No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
County-Pair FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 29615 7325 7305 29479 7289 7274
R2 0.44 0.68 0.68 0.04 0.28 0.32
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Table 2.8: Recourse Law and Sub-prime Loan Ratio
This table reports estimates and standard errors of regressions of the sub-prime
mortgage loan ratio for the period 2003-2009. Models (1)-(3) employ the sample
for the pre-crisis period 2003-2006 and Models (4)-(6) employ the total sample for
2003-2009 using the dierence-in-dierence approach. Crisis is a dummy variable
equals to zero before and including 2006, and one after that. The dependent variable
is the aggregate ratio of the number of sub-prime mortgage loans to the total
number of mortgage loans originated at the ZIP code-level. A state is classied as
a Non-recourse state (Non-recourse=1) if the state does not allow lenders to claim
deciency judgments in the event of mortgage default. Distance is the shortest
distance between the closest border and the centroid of a ZIP code. DistanceR
represents the interaction of distance and an indicator (I(recourse)). DistanceNR
represents the interaction of distance and an indicator (I(non-recourse)). The other
variables are dened in Table 1.2. All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and clustered at the county level. Coecients marked ***, ** and * are signicant
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Sub-prime Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non-recourse 0.00 0.08*** 0.06* 0.00 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Crisis -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Crisis*Non-recourse -0.06*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
GDP Growth -1.39*** -2.76*** -2.72*** -0.96*** -0.72*** -0.71***
(0.34) (0.50) (0.50) (0.18) (0.10) (0.10)
Income Growth 2.94*** 1.89*** 1.88*** 1.50*** 0.59*** 0.57***
(0.33) (0.47) (0.47) (0.19) (0.09) (0.09)
Unemployment 0.13 -7.82*** -7.81*** 0.66* -1.91*** -1.92***
(0.67) (1.25) (1.27) (0.37) (0.19) (0.19)
Pop. Growth 2.61*** 0.49 0.65 2.74*** 0.57 0.63
(0.72) (1.84) (1.85) (0.65) (0.45) (0.45)
Supply Elasticity -0.02** 0.07*** 0.01 -0.01 0.10*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Judicial Foreclosure -0.04* 0.07*** 0.07*** -0.02 0.04*** 0.05***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Property Tax 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.03*** -0.02**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
DistanceR -0.00 -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00)
DistanceNR 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
(DistanceR)2 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
(DistanceNR)2 -0.00** -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.14*** 0.52*** 0.62*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.24***
(0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
County-Pair Sample No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
County-Pair FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 23517 5810 5798 40927 10106 10085
R2 0.11 0.36 0.37 0.17 0.33 0.3499
Table 2.9: Interaction of Recourse Law and Sub-prime Loan Ratio
This table reports estimates and standard errors for regressions of housing price
growth on the interaction term of non-recourse law indicators and sub-prime loan
ratio for the full sample and the contiguous border county-pair sample for the pre-
crisis period 2003-2006. The dependent variable is Housing Price Growth (Sq. Ft),
the percentage annual growth rate of the median of sale prices scaled by the square
footage of a home. This measure is aggregated at the ZIP code-level. The sub-prime
loan ratio is the aggregate ratio of the number of sub-prime mortgage loans to the
total number of mortgage loans originated at the ZIP code-level. A state is classied
as a Non-recourse state (Non-recourse=1) if the state does not allow lender to claim
deciency judgments in the event of mortgage default. Distance is the shortest
distance between the closest border and the centroid of a ZIP code. DistanceR
represents the interaction of distance and an indicator (I(recourse)). DistanceNR
represents the interaction of distance and an indicator (I(non-recourse)).The other
variables are all state-level statistics. The other variables are dened in Table 1.2.
All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the county
level. Coecients marked ***, ** and * are signicant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-recourse -0.01 0.01 0.05** 0.05**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Subprime ratio 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Subprime ratio * Non-recourse 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.07** 0.07*
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
GDP Growth 1.65*** 1.67*** 1.66***
(0.24) (0.16) (0.16)
Income Growth -0.55*** -0.71*** -0.71***
(0.19) (0.14) (0.14)
Unemployment -2.16*** -1.31*** -1.25***
(0.43) (0.41) (0.42)
Pop. Growth -0.78** 1.09* 1.14*
(0.39) (0.62) (0.65)
Judicial Foreclosure 0.06*** 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Property Tax -0.07*** -0.03* -0.03
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
DistanceR -0.00
(0.00)
DistanceNR -0.00
(0.00)
(DistanceR)2 0.00*
(0.00)
(DistanceNR)2 0.00
(0.00)
Constant 0.09*** 0.20*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
County-Pair Sample No No Yes Yes
County-Pair FE No No Yes Yes
N 17177 17177 4126 4122
R2 0.08 0.24 0.29 0.29
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Comparison with Judicial Requirement
U.S. states have dierent laws regarding mortgage foreclosure. One of related pro-
visions in mortgage foreclosure laws is judicial foreclosure requirement. In judicial
foreclosure states lenders are required to go through the courts for a foreclosed sale
whereas in non-judicial foreclosure states lenders have the own right to sell the prop-
erty when borrowers are behind schedule on mortgage payments. According to Mian
et al. (2013), twenty states are classied as judicial foreclosure states. The distri-
bution of judicial foreclosure requirement is illustrated in Panel B of Figure 2.2. It
shows that non-recourse states are mostly located in West coast and upper Midwest
while the judicial foreclosure laws are mostly enacted in East coast. Among eleven
non-recourse states, three states (Iowa, North Dakota and Wisconsin) have the ju-
dicial foreclosure requirement. Ghent (2013) and Mian et al. (2013) argue that the
joint distribution of The mortgage laws were not caused by a certain economic reason
or state-level policy dierences.
Impacts of the judicial foreclosure requirement on the supply of mortgage loans
and house prices have been examined by Pence (2006) and Mian et al. (2013). Pence
(2006) nds that the judicial foreclosure requirement reduces mortgage credit sup-
ply by imposing greater costs on lenders seeking foreclosures on houses. Mian et al.
(2013), on the other hand, highlight that non-judicial foreclosure requirements have a
signicant negative impact on house prices by increasing the supply of houses through
the foreclosure process. Recourse law, which is not emphasized in these studies, clearly
diers from the judicial foreclosure requirement. Although the judicial requirement
has an eect on the foreclosure decision of homeowners, the liability of borrowers is
distinct from this judicial process. The judicial requirement does not protect borrow-
ers from unlimited liability.
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